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SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICIES, INDUSTRIAL
REFORM AND TECHNICAL PROGRESS IN CHINA
Can socialist property rights be compatible with technological catching up?
Alberto Gabriele
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
Abstract
This paper analyses the quest for technological progress in China, a large, semi-industrialized,
socialist developing country. In the introduction, it is argued that international income convergence
is not an automatic product of market forces. Therefore, the path of technological progress in a less
advanced country is dependent on its absorptive capacity, which can be enhanced by the development
of an effective national innovation system. The specific meaning attached to key terms such as
technological progress, market-compatibility and “socialism” are also explained. Section II briefly
illustrates the relative position of China in the international division of labour, as well as some basic
economic and social indicators. Section III contends that the huge amount of FDI flowing to China
is not per se a major source of technical progress, but important gains can be obtained through
strategic bargaining with large transnational corporations from industrialized countries. Section IV
sketches the main lines of evolution of Chinese technological culture since the inception of the reforms
and provides basic data on China’s R&D system. Section V analyses the new focus of innovation and
research policies and describes the major science and technology programmes. Section VI shifts the
analysis to the level of industrial enterprises, arguing that a kind of symbiosis exists among the two
groups of public firms. Collective enterprises realize their comparative advantage specializing in
simpler industrial activities and benefit from technological spillovers from state-owned enterprises,
while the latter are undergoing a process of upgrading and rationalization in order to gain a strong
position at the upper end of the technological spectrum. This section also presents and illustrates
aggregate data on production and employment trends in China’s industry and proposes a tentative
estimate of the technical change component of labour productivity growth in state-owned enterprises,
showing that it has been substantial and increased in the late 1990s. Section VII concludes that
China’s experience so far shows that a radical improvement in a socialist economy’s ability to achieve
technical progress is not inconsistent with the reaffirmation, in a new and diversified form, of a
fundamentally public framework of property relations.
I.  INTRODUCTION
This  paper  focuses  on  some  aspects  of  the  catching-up  effort  being  carried  out  in  a socialist
developing country such as China. In this introduction, besides mentioning some of the topics that will be
discussed, I shall specify the function and meaning to be attached to a few basic concepts in order to
clarify the theoretical background referred to in parts of the text.
Some policy-related features of China’s overall development strategy will be examined from the
point of view of the pursuit of a single crucial goal, which is technical progress. The concept of technical
progress used in this paper is broad and goes beyond the scientific and technical innovations stemming
directly and indirectly from R&D activities aimed at the generation of new knowledge. In fact, technical
progress also encompasses the web of imitative and adaptive changes – in the realms of production
organization,  product  design,  materials  and  energy  consumption,  procurement,  sales  and  distribution,
management, finance, administration, and other economically relevant activities – which result in higher- 2 -
1 For “growth convergence” we mean a state of affairs in which poorer countries grow faster than rich ones,
so  that  their  per  capita  incomes  eventually converge towards the same level. In relation to the concept of
“conditional  convergence”  (see  footnote  2), the aforementioned type of convergence might be called “absolute
convergence”. Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995a: 420), referring to an ample data set on real per capita growth rates in
different  countries,  show that the absolute convergence hypothesis “fares badly in terms of the cross-country data
… for 119 countries, the growth rate from 1965 to 1985 is basically unrelated to the log of per capita GDP in 1965 …
. Thus, any hope of reconciling the convergence hypothesis with the data has to rely on the concept of conditional
convergence”.
2 Barro  and  Sala-i-Martin  (1995b)  developed  the  concept  of  “conditional  convergence”, according to which
the  coexistence of a complex series of conditions is a necessary condition for convergence to occur. Conditional
convergence appears to have occurred among the relatively similar OECD countries.
3 A  number  of  observers have attempted to explain the lack of convergence focusing on structural factors,
among  them  human  capital  (Barro  and  Sala-I-Martin,  1995a,  b)  and  externalities  (Lucas,  1990).  Others  individuate  in
the very shallow division of labour (à la Smith) the origin of the underdevelopment trap, in which both wages and
the rate of profit are low, and thus no foreign capital is forthcoming and no movement towards a higher level steady
state takes place (Rodriguez-Clare, 1996). A shallow division of labour is tantamount to a lack of diffusion of those
roundabout  production  methods  typical  of developed economies, which to be implemented need the complementary
presence of many specialized physical inputs as well as intermediate goods difficult or costly to acquire in the South,
which  are  only  imperfectly  tradeable.  A  fortiori,  modern  production  requires  a  series  of  producer  services  (banking,
auditing,  machine  repair,  etc.)  and  infrastructures,  which  are  of  course  non-tradeable  (Porter,  1990).  Moreover, local
institutions might also be inadequate, and amenable to change only over a relatively long period of time.
4 Neoclassical  theory  would,  in  principle,  predict higher-than-average rates of return to capital in poorer
countries,  according  to  their  lower  K/L  ratios.  Capital  should  hence  flow  abundantly towards developing countries,
leading to very high growth rates. In practice, this is not necessarily the case, due to the absence in these countries
of  a  host  of  complementary  conditions,  which  constitutes  the  essence  of  underdevelopment.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  in
the long run, the classical assumption on the uniformity of the rate of profit tends to hold also at the international
level (Rodriguez-Clare, 1996).
productivity and jointly foster the progressive climbing of the technological ladder and a more favourable
position in the international division of labour. As the most widely used, if imperfect, quantitative indicator
of technical progress is the evolution of total factor productivity (TFP) the paper will also review the
debate on the estimates of TFP growth in different sectors of the Chinese economy, and especially in the
reforming sector of industrial state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Other related topics, such as the technical
progress-enhancing  potential  of  foreign direct investment (FDI) and of cooperation with large
transnational corporations (TNCs) from developed countries, will also be briefly examined in the first part
of section II. However, the core of the paper is constituted by an analysis of the evolution of China’s
research and development (R&D) and industrial systems, with particular attention to the latter’s still
dominant state and collectively owned enterprises (COEs), seen as the key components of the country’s
overall national system of innovation (NSI).
An “effort” is needed in a relatively poor country in order to “catch up” with more advanced ones
because automatic market mechanisms do not lead to international growth convergence.
1 International
convergence appears to be a phenomenon limited to clusters of highly integrated economies at not too
distant levels of overall development,
2 and/or to the cases of individual countries, or groups of countries
which have implemented strong and proactive accumulation and growth-enhancing economic strategies
(UNCTAD, 1997, 1998).
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Therefore, even taking into account the relevance of exogenous constraints, the appropriateness of
national development strategies carries a decisive weight, at least for those developing countries which,
due to a set of historical and structural factors, are in fact endowed with an appreciable degree of
autonomy and self-determination. These countries must open up and rely to a large extent on the
progressive absorption of foreign technology, mainly from the developed countries of the North, but this
goal cannot be achieved simply as a byproduct of economic liberalization.
4 North-South R&D spillovers- 3 -
5 One of the main transmission channels is the importation of machines from developed countries, which acts
as vectors of the knowledge produced by the R&D carried out in the North (Bayoumi et al., 1999).
6 It has been argued that, if a developing country’s absorptive capacity is too weak, trade with more
advanced  countries  can  lead  to  an  unfavourable  divergence  in  growth  rates,  which actually widens the technological
and economic gap over time (Feenstra, 1996).
7 Abramovitz  (1989: xviii, 377) was among the first to recognize that the exploitation of the catching-up
potential stemming from backwardness was related to a country’s “social capability”.
do occur through international trade,
5 but it is not trade per se which brings about the transmission of
knowledge.  The  diffusion  of  R&D  results across borders is more partial and slow than simplified
neoclassical assumptions might allow (Lichtemberg, 1992), consistently with the common founding of high
social returns to R&D at the national level. The diffusion of knowledge through trade depends to some
extent on factors belonging to the most advanced trade partners, as some firms are more willing than
others to transfer knowledge to their partners from developing countries. However, a set of endogenous
factors typical of each country, which jointly constitute its absorptive capacity, carry a far heavier weight.
6
The concept of absorptive capacity was pioneered by Cohen and Levinthal, who applied it to the
analysis of the optimizing strategy of a firm in a competitive national market, but can be readily extended
to a developing country’s efforts to enhance its efficiency in the task of keeping up with externally
generated  science  and  technology  (S&T)  advances.  Cohen  and Levinthal (1990) define absorptive
capacity as “the ability of a firm to recognize the value of new, external information, assimilate it and
apply to commercial ends… [which is] … largely a function of the level of prior knowledge…” and argue
that it is “critical to its innovative capabilities” (idem: 128). Therefore, prior knowledge has to be seen not
only as a stock of information, but also as a “set of learning skills” (idem: 130). An organization’s
absorptive  capacity  goes  beyond  the  abilities  of its individual components, as there are aspects of
absorptive capacity which are distinctly organizational and depend not only on the firm’s interface with
the external environment but also on “transfers of knowledge across and within subunits” internal to the
organization  itself”  (idem:  132).  In  the  case  of  a  firm,  absorptive  capacity,  along  with  other  mostly
informal activities, depends on its R&D effort, because “R&D not only generates new information, but
also enhances the firm’s ability … to identify, assimilate and exploit knowledge from the environment”
(Cohen and Levinthal, 1989: 569). When the concept is extended to a country, absorptive capacity is to
be considered a function of several structural and policy-related domestic factors, among which the
availability of human capital (measured, for instance by the rate of literacy, and the number of technicians
and engineers), besides, of course, the existence, extent, effectiveness and flexibility of a national R&D
and innovation system (Keller, 1996).
The concept of social
7 or national absorptive capacity is closely related to that of an NSI. The
notion of NSI was introduced in contemporary debate by Freeman (1987), who defined NSI as “the
network of institutions in the public and private sectors whose activities and interactions initiate, import,
modify and diffuse new technologies” (Archibugi et al., 1999: 1), and developed by Lundvall (1992) and
Nelson (1993). According to Chesnais (1995), the notion of NSI encompasses a set of interactions among
technology, trade and growth, “so as to suggest that the performance of national economies depends on
the manner in which organizational and institutional arrangements and linkages conducive to innovation
and growth have been permitted to thrive in different countries” (Dosi, 1999: 23).
A country’s NSI may be seen as an organization of a higher hierarchical level than that of the firm,
and to which the same concepts can be applied. The wider the gap between a country’s technological- 4 -
8 The COE industrial sector comprises township and village enterprises (TVEs), plus a number of very small
enterprises  at  below  village  level.  As  this  study  focuses  on not-so-small industrial firms, the terms COE and TVE
refer in practice to the same group of industrial firms.
9 A  sound  “market-compatible” activity must be based on realistic and informed forecasts on the likely
evolution  of  market  and  technology  trends.  Of  course,  large  private  firms  in  capitalist countries routinely engage in
market-compatible,  but  not  directly  market-oriented,  activities  as part of their overall profit-maximizing strategy. For
instance, most private R&D activities tend to be market-compatible rather than directly market-oriented.
level and that of the world leaders, the more its indigenous R&D and related formal and informal learning
efforts  will  be  geared  to  absorb externally generated knowledge rather than to produce truly “new”
knowledge. Moreover, the acceleration of the globalization process worldwide, with the increase in the
speed and diffusion of information flows and the strengthening of international competition forces, makes
it even less feasible than in the past for any single country to pursue an idiosyncratic technological path
of its own, isolated from external S&T trends. For semi-industrialized countries, these factors further
strengthen  the  strategic  decisiveness  of  enhancing  their  nationwide  absorptive  capacity.  Countries
attempting to keep up must strive to earmark more resources to R&D and related activities, on the one
hand, and to improve the functioning of their S&T apparatus and its interactions with productive
enterprises, on the other hand, in order to facilitate the transfer of knowledge among the various subunits
of their NIS.
As this concept of NSI, like that of technical progress, is a broad one, comprising seemingly distant
structures such as the national R&D system and the industrial sector, this paper will also discuss some
aspects of the reform of China’s SOEs. Most SOEs are expected to be progressively de-statized in
different ways (mergers with other SOEs or COEs,
8 sales to TNCs or private capitalists, and outright
bankruptcy  and  liquidation).  A  core  group  of  about  1000  large  SOEs  (those most capitalized and
technologically advanced) is to be strengthened and prioritized in order to turn them into modern world-
class enterprises with the potential for reaching and keeping the technological edge. Particular attention
will be dedicated to the interaction among the different layers of socialist property rights relations, their
implications for corporate governance and managers’ and workers’ incentives, and their ultimate impact
on technical progress and more generally on the attainment of an intensive path of sustained economic
growth. As a tool of this analysis, a distinction will be made between the concepts of “market orientation”
and “market compatibility”. An activity is “market-oriented” if it is aimed at realizing a profit by means
of a relatively straightforward transformation, distribution, or servicing process based almost exclusively
on information stemming from prices and other signals emanating from existing markets. Conversely, by
the term “market-compatible” we refer to an economic activity which, even if it is not necessarily directly
geared to selling in presently existing markets, is nevertheless oriented towards the creation of future
market competitiveness in advanced sectors via a more roundabout and long innovation and production
process.
9
The  above  observations  apply  to  all  relatively  underdeveloped  countries.  This  paper  however,
focuses on a very particular developing country, China, which is unique in its size and the enormous
development potential of its reforming socialist market economy. The term “socialist market economy”
is  employed  officially  by  the  Chinese  government  and  is  consistent  with  the  definition  used  here  of
“socialist” – which is a rather narrow and technical one, and which relates exclusively to the domain of
property rights. For “socialist” property rights, or “socialist” ownership of means of production, or even
“socialist”  production  relations, we simply mean that the a commanding share of property rights,- 5 -
10 In  recent  orthodox  literature,  the  word  “residual”  is  often  preferred  to  the  classical term “surplus”. They
are used interchangeably in this paper.
11 Terms  such  as  “commanding share” or “substantial control” do not always correspond to a specific
percentage  share  of  formal  ownership  rights;  thus,  on  one  hand,  they  should  be  interpreted in a rather qualitative
and flexible way, and, on the other, to be employed meaningfully, they sometimes require a thorough knowledge of
the specific reality of a firm or other institution.
12 The  term  maintains  a  more  direct  relation  with  the  question  of  income  distribution.  Socialist  ownership of
the means of production in principle allows public institutions, such as national and local governments, and a higher
degree  of  freedom  in  influencing  income  distribution  with  respect  to  private  property.  Thus,  “although  often  viewed
as  necessary  for  economic  development  in  its  earlier  stages,  public  ownership  in  China  is  also  seen  as  necessary
to preserve social equity and other values; in that sense it is an objective … and not simply a means of reform. These
values are also reflected in … a preference for collective ownership forms in the non-state sector” (OECD, 2000: 10).
The effective realization of public ownership’s potential advantages with respect to equity is dependent upon the
relative  priority  attached  to  distributional  goals  by  policy-making  institutions,  as  well  as  upon  a  host  of  specific
circumstances typical of any country in a given developmental stage (see subsection II.C and footnote 75).
particularly substantial control on the surplus,
10 is bestowed on one or more non-private institutions, be
they central or local government bodies or other relatively autonomous institutions such as banks, financial
companies,  universities,  R&D  centres,  and  others.
11  As  such,  the  definition  “socialist”  is  by  itself
inappropriate  vis-à-vis  other  concepts  and  values  often  associated  with  socialism, such as justice,
egalitarianism, planning, freedom or the lack of it, and may be easily interchanged with the term “public”.
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II. BASIC FACTS ABOUT CHINA
A.  Fast GDP growth
At the time of the foundation of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the bulk of its population
was constituted of destitute and illiterate peasants. The infrastructure was dilapidated and little was left
intact in the few pre-war industrial enclaves. Since then, China has followed a rapid, if highly unstable,
development path. By the mid-1970s, the country had undergone a vast, albeit autarkic and relatively
inefficient,  process  of  industrialization.  Life  expectancy  and  infant  mortality  indexes  had  experienced
dramatic improvements. A large majority of the population has become literate and its basic needs in
terms of food, health and education met. These achievements are largely due to the fact that China is one
of the most egalitarian countries in the world.
Since the inception of bold agricultural reforms in the late 1970s, followed by successive waves of
reforms in the industrial sector during the 1980s and 1990s, the overall rate of growth and, broadly
speaking, economic development have accelerated markedly, making China the fastest growing economy
in the world. GDP growth has averaged over 10 per cent in the latest two decades, a performance not
only unrivalled by any other large country in the last quarter of the XXth century, but also with very few,
if any, precedents in the course of modern economic history. Private consumption had also experienced
very fast expansion, improving enormously the material well-being of most urban and rural Chinese, even
taking into account the multiple social and environmental drawbacks of the new economic path (see
table 1). The proportion of the population considered as absolutely poor fell from over 50 per cent in 1978
to 8 per cent in 1997, according to national estimates, and from over 60 per cent to 22 per cent, according
to the World Bank (OECD, 2000).- 6 -
13 All  data  in  this  subsection  are  from  tables  4  and  5.  The  sources  for  these tables are UNDP (2000) and
UNCTAD (2000a). While the most basic indicators, such as those on life expectancy and the literacy rate, pose no
interpretation problems, others – such as the Human Development and Human Poverty Index – have been produced
according  to  a  methodology  specifically  elaborated  within  the  framework  of  the  preparation of the  Human
Development  Report,  which  is  inevitably  ad  hoc  and  subjective  to  a  non-negligible  degree.  Therefore,  especially in
the  context  of  this  paper,  which  is focused on very different issues pertaining to the sphere of technology and
industrial organization, these social indexes are reported only as very broad background references.
Table 1
China: basic economic indicators, 1980–1999
(Average annual percentage growth)
China East Asia and the Pacific World Rep. of Korea 
a
                                                                                                                                         
1980–89 1990–99 1980–89 1990–99 1980–89 1990–99 1980–89 1990–99
GDP 10.1 10.7 8.0 7.4 3.2 2.5 9.4 5.7
Exports 19.3 13.0 11.1 12.6 5.2 6.9 12.0 15.6
1980–99 1980–99 1980–99 1980–99
                                                          
Private
consumption
(per capita) 7.2 5.6 1.3 6.5
Sources: World Bank (2000a).
a: Second fastest growing economy.
B.  Rapid export expansion and upgrading of exports
Export growth was much faster than GDP growth, transforming the China’s economy from a quasi-
autarkic one into a very internationally integrated one, with extraordinarily high trade ratios for a country
that  size  (tables  1  and 2). China’s export also underwent a process of increasing upgrading and
diversification. The share of primary goods in total exports declined sharply, while that of manufactures
increased from 50 per cent in 1980 to almost 90 per cent in 1998. The subcategory of relatively advanced
manufactures constituted by machinery and transport equipment increased its share of manufactured
exports from 9 per cent in 1980 to 27 per cent in 1998 (table 2).
China’s  exports are now more diversified than those of any other developing country, and
specifically than those of the Republic of Korea, Taiwan Province of China, the United States and Japan
(table  3)  Only  the  Netherlands,  Italy  and  the  Czech  Republic  exhibited  a  lower  Hirshmann export
concentration index in 1997 (UNCTAD, 2000a, table 4.5).
C.  Relatively slow improvement in social indicators and mass education
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Thanks to its exceptional growth record, China’s per capita GDP climbed from abysmally low levels
to more than $3000 (in purchasing power parity terms) in 1998 – not much lower than in countries like the
Philippines and Cuba (see table 4). Taking into account the social progress already realized up to the late
1970s, however, social advancements so far since the inception of the reforms have been substantial,- 7 -
14 Income distribution in China is still rather egalitarian, compared to most other developing countries. It
should also be taken into account that the very size of China and its extraordinary pace of structural change would
tend ceteris paribus to imply a more unequal distribution pattern than in smaller and slower growing countries, for
purely  statistical  reasons.  A  UNDP  estimate  of  one  of  many  existing  income distribution indicators is reported in
table 3, along with those of other developing countries. On income distribution see also footnotes 12 and 75.
15 To  determine  to  what  extent  this  relative  social  deterioration should be considered an inevitable trade-off
for  the  achievements  of  the  economic  reforms  would  constitute  a  very  complex and debatable task, which goes
beyond the scope of this paper.
Table 2
Basic data on trade and export structure: China and other countries
China India United States Japan
A.   Trade data, 1999
Export fob (US$ billions) 989 435 9,299 4,351
Exports + imports/GDP 0.36 0.10 0.18 0.16
Exports/GDP 0.20 0.09 0.07 0.09
B.  Evolution of China’s export structure
1980 1994 1998                           
Primary goods 50 16 11
Manufactured goods 50 83 89
•   of which machinery and transport equipment 9 18 27
Sources: EIU (2000); SSB (2000).
but less than fully satisfactory, as evidenced by their comparison not only with other developing socialist
countries like Cuba and Viet Nam, but even with several capitalist developing countries. Most observers
agree on ascribing this phenomenon mainly to the deterioration in income distribution, which has become
more unequal
14 than in the past, and to the decline of the traditional social services, especially in rural
areas.
15
Actually, improvements in life expectancy, the infant mortality rate, and more controversial indicators
elaborated by UNDP such as the Human Poverty and Human Development Indexes rank China high
among all developing countries, but not among the small group of socially best performing countries.
Consistently, the difference between China’s Human Development Index and GDP per capita ranking
– which may be seen as a rough proxy of a country’s ability to translate economic growth into social
progress – is positive (a better-than-average performance), but lower, for instance, than in Sweden and
Cuba (see table 4).
Finally, we briefly refer to the education-related social indicators, which are of special interest for
the purposes of this study. Apart from its obvious value as an ultimate goal of development, education is
also a means to increase a country’s human capital, and thus its ability to generate and absorb technical- 8 -
Table 3
Export concentration indexes 
a
1990 1997
                                                                                                            
Concentration Number of Concentration Number of
index commodities index commodities
exported exported
China 0.080 229 0.068 233
Republic of Korea 0.103 211 0.145 220
Taiwan Prov. of China 0.086 216 0.119 223
India 0.142 207 0.122 221
United States 0.071 226 0.078 226
Japan 0.216 230 0.130 233
Sources: UNCTAD (2000a).
a The table presents a normalized Hirshmann index, with values ranging from 0 (minimum concentration) to 1
(maximum concentration).
Table 4
GDP per capita and social indicators 
a
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
GDP per Income Infant Life Progress Human HDI rank Human
capita distribu- mortality expect- in life Devel- minus GDP Poverty
 (PPP tion 
b rate 
c ancy expect- opment per capita Index
 US$) ancy 
d Index rank rank
rank
China 3,105 7.9 38 70.1 6.6 99 7 30
Other countries:
Brazil -- -- 36 -- -- -- -- --
Costa Rica 5,987 9.6 -- -- -- -- -- --
Cuba 3,967 -- 7 75.8 -- -- 40 3
Kyrgyzstan -- -- -- -- -- 98 -- --
Mexico -- 16.2 -- -- -- -- -- --
Philippines 3,555 -- -- -- 10.5 -- -- --
Rep. of Korea -- -- -- -- -- 31 -- --
Sweden -- -- -- -- -- -- 15 --
United States 29,605 -- -- 76.8 -- -- -- --
Viet Nam 1,207 5.6 -- -- -- -- -- --
Sources: UNDP (2000).
a For 1998, except column (5).
b Share of income: richest 20 per cent/poorest 20 per cent.
c Per 1000 live births.
d 1995–2000, minus 1970–1975.- 9 -
progress. The adult literacy rate (82.8 per cent in 1998) in China is higher than in most other developing
countries, but lower, for instance, not only than in Cuba, but also than in much poorer Viet Nam and in the
Philippines. The secondary age group enrolment ratio in education also leaves room for improvement.
Public expenditure on education in the mid-1990s, as a share of GDP, was lower in China than in the
Republic of Korea and India. The youth literacy rate, however, is very high, suggesting that a massive




Adult Youth Secondary Education Public
literacy literacy age group index expenditure
rate 
a rate 
b enrolment (1998) on education




China 82.8 97.2 70.0 0.79 2.5
Other countries:
Cuba 96.4 - - - -
India - - - - 3.4
Mexico - 96.6 - - -
Nigeria - - - - 0.9
Philippines - - 77.8 0.91 -
Rep. of Korea - - - - 3.7
United States (1994) - - - - 5.4 
d
Viet Nam 92.9 - - - -
Sources: UNDP (2000); UNCTAD (2000a).
a Percentage of age 15 and above.
b Percentage of age 15 to 24.
c Percentage of relevant age group, adjusted.
d In 1994.
III.  THE TWO-PRONGED POLICY APPROACH TOWARDS FDI
A.  The limited potential of FDI per se as a technology conveyor
The creation, acquisition and diffusion of innovation is the product of the interaction of foreign and
domestic factors. Among the former, especially in developing countries, the role of technology transfers
from TNCs through FDI and other channels is of course very important. It will be argued, however, that
the technology transfers to be expected from most of the FDI presently taking place in China should not
be overestimated, and the benefits attainable from “high-technology” foreign investment, as well as from
other forms of cooperation with TNCs, are contingent on the upgrading of domestic absorption capacity
via the development of the S&T system and the modernization of industrial enterprises.- 10 -
16 Mergers  and  acquisitions  are  usually  followed by restructuring exercises which can eventually benefit the
host country, but do not by themselves add to its productive capacity.
17 While  absorbing  a  huge  amount  of  FDI,  China  has  managed  so  far  to  avoid  being  flooded  by  large  and
unstable financial capital inflows, which have contributed to crises in many developing countries (Boratav et al.,
2000).
Foreign  direct investment can allow financially stripped developing countries to increase their
investment rates, thus fostering employment and economic growth. FDI contribution to technical progress
is more controversial. According to theory, FDI can advance economic growth in the host economy
through global technology transfers and domestic knowledge spillovers, fostering product and process
innovations, introducing new management practices and contributing to the building of human capital
(Knell and Radosevic, 2000). Coe and Helpman (1995) show that international R&D spillovers play an
important role in contributing to productivity growth across industries. Under favourable circumstances,
R&D spillovers can arise from trade and FDI flows, but they are not an automatic byproduct of either.
As pointed out, for instance, by Estrella Tolentino (1993), there is a threshold in the level of domestic
technological competence, below which FDI might even stifle domestic competition and thus provoke
underdevelopment, dependent development, and technological decline in low-income countries which lack
domestic R&D and technological capacities. Conversely, if local technological competence is adequate,
a virtuous cycle can be put into motion. Thus, the assimilation of outside technology is heavily dependent
upon the development of domestic technological capabilities (Young and Lan, 1997), and host country
factors  are  crucial  in  the  attempt  to  enact  technology  transfers  from  foreign  investors  in  developing
countries.  Among  these  factors,  of  course,  the  role  of  government, and in particular its “macro-
organizational strategy” (Buckley et al., 1992), are of great importance.
Especially where strategic and high technology sectors are concerned, “the outcomes of FDI depend
significantly on how well a host economy bargains with international investors … a passive, laissez-faire
approach is unlikely to be sufficient because of failures in markets and deficiencies in existing institutions”
(UNCTAD, 1999b: xxxii–xxxiii). Unfortunately, most developing countries are at a great disadvantage
vis-à-vis TNCs in this domain, owing not only to the ever increasing technological and informational gap
between the centre and the periphery worldwide, but also to the self-inflicted wounds caused by the
excesses of liberalization and the unwise implementation of non-discretionary incentive policies.
B.  The boom of FDI flows to China and the quantitative
prevalence of low-technology investments
 
Among developing countries, China has been exceptionally successful in attracting FDI, accounting
for about one third of inflows to all developing countries in 1997–1998 (see table 6). Moreover, as opposed
to the rest of the developing world, most of this investment has been of the greenfield type, i.e. real new
investment adding to the productive capacity of the country, instead of representing essentially a change
of ownership
16 following the privatization of previous SOEs (UNCTAD, 1999a).
17
The  contribution  of  FDI  to  the  overall growth of the Chinese economy has been positive and
substantial. The share of FDI in total fixed investment has exceeded 14 per cent, on average, during the
period  1995–1997,  which is very high, even if it represents less than one seventh of the overall- 11 -
18 UNCTAD  (1999b)  might  have  overestimated  the  relative  contribution  of  FDI  to  capital  accumulation in
China.  According  to  official  Chinese  sources  (State  Statistical  Bureau),  FDI  contribution  to  total  fixed  assets
investment  was  just  over  10  per  cent  on  average  for  the  three  peak  years  1995–1997,  and  declined thereafter (Ge,
2000, table 5).
19 China’s openness to FDI contrasts markedly with Japan’s and the Republic of Korea’s more closed policy
attitude towards foreign investors during comparable stages of their catching-up process (Hsieh, 1994).
accumulation effort of the country (UNCTAD, 1999b, Annex table B5,
18 and table 6 below). FDI has




FDI inflows to China
1988–93  1997  1998  1999
(average)
FDI inflows (US$ billions):
•  China 8.8 44.2 43.75 40.4
•  All developing countries 46.9 178.8 179.5 207.6
•  Average South Asia, East
Asia and South-East Asia 27.1 93.5 87.2 96.1
FDI/gross fixed capital formation (percentage):
•  China 6.4 14.6 12.9 --
•  Average developing countries 4.6 10.8 11.5 --
•  Average South Asia, East
Asia and South-East Asia 5.5 9.8 10.5 --
1980      1995   1998
                          
FDI stocks as a percentage of GDP:
•  China 3.1 19.6 27.6
•  Average developing countries 5.4 13.4 20.0
•  Average South Asia, East
Asia and South-East Asia 7.9 15.0 23.3
Sources: UNCTAD (2000b).
The  government’s  strategy  vis-à-vis foreign investors appears to recognize the existence of a
fundamental difference between low-tech FDI, carried out mainly by expatriate Chinese and firms from
the East Asian region, on one hand, and high-technology FDI, carried out by large TNCs from the West
and Japan, on the other hand.
A  case  study  (Young  and  Lan,  1997)  carried  out  in  Dalian,  one  of  China’s  14  economic and
technology development zones, is very illustrative of a scenario which is probably common to most FDI
ventures  of  the  low-tech  type,  which  are  by  far  the  most numerous. The study shows clearly that- 12 -
20 According to Young and Lan (1997: 676), flaws in the government policy carry part of the blame, as the main
thrust  of  policy  makers,  particularly  during  the  low  phases  of  the  economic  cycle, has been that of offering very
generous but poorly targeted incentive packages, with the “effect of encouraging the quantity rather than the quality
of FDI”. To some extent excessive interferences in regulating foreign firms’ activities – such as in the ceilings
imposed on output prices and on ownership shares in joint ventures with local firms – may actually discourage the
development of local linkages and act as brakes on technology transfers.
21 It is rationally in the interest of TNCs to play firm against firm, locality against locality and country against
country in order to obtain maximum advantages from cheap labour and market control, while releasing to a minimum
degree their technological monopoly: “As commercial enterprises, TNCs in principle do not have an interest in
transferring knowledge to and supporting innovation in foreign affiliates …” (UNCTAD, 1999b: 219). The behaviour
of  foreign  investors  is  independent  of  the  property  status of local firms, as far as the latter act in a decentralized
fashion obeying chiefly the target of profit maximization, even if the latter is partially tempered by local employment
and other valuable social objectives, rather delinked from the goal of fostering technological progress nation-wide
in the long term.
technology transfer through FDI in Dalian is fairly low. There is little local R&D and thus little absorptive
capacity, and there has been no effort to attract R&D into FDI firms. To a large extent, this was to be
expected, given the level of technological competence in the bulk of China’s industry, outside the small
islands of technological and scientific excellence confined to the main R&D centres and to a reduced
number of advanced large SOEs and joint ventures. Moreover, most foreign investors are interested in
exploiting the availability of cheap and abundant labour and of a suitable infrastructure in order to set up
low-tech ventures in mature light industrial sectors (mainly textile and apparel), aiming at realizing quick
profits.
20 Moreover, as a result of excessive decentralization, incentive-based competition among different
localities to attract FDI is probably too fierce, with pledgings by foreign firms being poorly specified and
usually limited to export targets rather than technology transfers. In fact, a more sophisticated technology
policy  approach  would  be  hard  to implement at a very decentralized level, taking into account local
planning and research capabilities, on the one hand, and the short-term horizon of foreign investors, on the
other hand. In sum, Dalian, like most FDI-intensive areas, is doing well in terms of exports, profits and
employment, but is advancing modestly in terms of technology, in spite of the clear awareness of Chinese
managers of the importance of this issue. 
The Dalian experience is consistent with the results of an econometric study carried out on a larger
sample of manufacturing firms in eight Chinese cities. This study shows that, while competition from more
advanced foreign firms contributes to intensifying Chinese enterprises’ own training and learning efforts,
FDI per se does not significantly contribute to technology transfers and to the productivity growth of local
firms (Kinoshita, 1999).
 These findings are not surprising, taking into account that most Chinese COEs and many non-
strategic SOEs behave to a large extent like small or medium privately owned firms in other developing
countries. Their approach tends to be strongly market-driven but short-sighted and lacks a long-term
technology strategy. As a result, their cooperative relations with foreign investors from more advanced
countries, and especially with TNCs, is uneven, albeit mutually profitable. Foreign counterparts tend to
have better long-term strategies and enjoy a significant degree of technological monopoly. The bargaining
power pattern determined by the market in the absence of effective industrial policies is such that foreign
investors reap most of the benefits, at the expense of local firms and workers.
21 In China, this type of FDI
has fulfilled and still plays a positive role for targets such as GNP growth, exports and employment, and
to a certain degree it contributes to spreading contacts with advanced Western productive, managerial and
financial technologies. But to base future technological progress only on this passive form of technological- 13 -
22 “There is role for policy in upgrading capabilities to optimize the transfer of TNC technology … there is a
continuum of strategies with regard to the transfer, generation and diffusion of technology” (UNCTAD, 1999b: 219).
S&T  strategies,  which  rely  on  several institutional arrangements and multiple, non-mutually incompatible
instruments  and  programmes,  are  always  to  be  preferred  to  one-dimensional  ones.  The  severe  risks implied by the
alternative choice of a completely centralized technological strategy are well illustrated by the Soviet experience. The
USSR  achieved  some  great  technological achievements, such as the creation of a modern aerospace and military
industry.  The  costs  of  following  this  over-centralized  and  autarkic  technological  pattern,  however,  were  enormous,
as  it  led  to  losing touch with the market-driven, more advanced technological avenues embraced by the already far
more  advanced  Western  countries.  Many  fatal  scientific and technological mistakes occurred due to the country’s
isolation and to the lack of long-run market compatibility of the Soviet NSI.
23 National  autonomy  is  enhanced  by  the  fact  that,  as  opposed  to most other developing countries, in China
political  and  economic  power  is  not  concentrated  in  the  hands  of  a  post-colonial bourgeoisie structurally dependent
on its subordinate relation with transnational capital.
24 Conversely, a major trade-off of China’s entry in the WTO is likely to be constituted by the partial erosion
of its negotiating power with respect to TNCs.
absorption would clearly be unrealistic. Other policy instruments are warranted.
22 Low-tech FDI, besides
generating  foreign  exchange, can help to improve marginally overall marketing and the technological
environment,  but  its  main  role  with  respect  to  goal  of  the technical progress should be that of
complementing, supporting and contributing to finance other, more centralized and strategic paths to
accelerated technological development. 
C.  China’s bargaining position vis-à-vis TNCs and the role of absorptive capacity
A  crucial  component of the “high” layer of the overall Chinese technological strategy is the
discretionary and centralized cooperation with top TNCs from advanced capitalist countries. China’s large
market and its independent political position
23 potentially allows for a considerable negotiating power vis-à-
vis major Western TNCs. This power, if properly utilized, can lead to ambitious high-technology joint
programmes with a high potential for the acquisition and mastering of foreign technology and for achieving
positive interactions and feedbacks with the indigenous S&T system. Such a centralized, planned S&T
strategy,  carried  out  through  quasi-administrative, albeit flexible instruments such as long term
programmes, priority projects, and joint ventures in high-technology sectors, is suited for targeting the most
advanced  segments  of  the  technological  and  scientific  spectrum.
24  It  is also compatible and in fact
complementary with the partial flexibilization, marketization and commoditization, of (mainly domestic)
technology trading and transfers, which is suitable for the medium and lower levels of the S&T range (see
section IV). 
This strategic component constitutes the opposite of a laissez-faire policy stance – which, on the
contrary, prevails in the trait offered to those mostly Asian firms which provide the bulk of FDI in
quantitative terms. In China, it applies to an ample gamut of instruments traditionally considered as part
of the domain of industrial policies and to the negotiating power of central government bodies, to an extent
matched by few other large developing countries. Moreover, at odds with the trend prevailing in most of
the developing world, Chinese planners rely heavily on the maintenance and strengthening of an advanced
core of state-owned industries as a key instrument to engage in joint high-technology ventures along with
TNCs (see section V).
Consistently with Cohen and Levinthan’s theory referred to in the introduction, however, the viability
of the strategic component of China’s approach to FDI is contingent on the continuous development of
its absorptive capacity, as a precondition to achieving effective technology transfers from TNCs investing- 14 -
25 Yu (1999: 10–11). These policy lines were originally elaborated by the China State Science and Technology
Commission and eventually endorsed by the State Council in 1981.
26 An important endorsement of reforms came with a central committee resolution on the reform of the S&T
system in 1985.
in the country. As China is not the world technological leader, R&D activities carried out inside industrial
enterprises, in universities and in specialized research centres, must be geared to a large extent towards
the enhancement of learning and adaptive capabilities, rather than towards the generation of innovations
which are absolutely “new”. The evolution of the R&D system examined in the following section should
therefore be seen as the progressive refinement and improvement of China’s ability to understand and
master  already  existing knowledge and to develop it to suit the needs of national technological and
economic upgrading.
IV.  THE EVOLUTION OF CHINA’S R&D SYSTEM
A.  The change in China’s technological culture and the
commercialization of small-scale R&D activities
  Traditionally, in China different S&T policy cultures (which Baark, 1992, identifies as bureaucratic,
entrepreneurial  and  academic) have been coexisting with difficulty, resulting in a certain degree of
fragmentation. The influence of the bureaucratic and academic cultures and the resulting tensions and
contradictions  have  limited  the  capacity  to  exploit  the  potential  for  feedback and backward linkages
between productive enterprises, on one hand, and the S&T system, on the other hand. The reforms
initiated in the mid-1970s brought about a change in the ideological climate also in this domain. Hence, by
the early 1980s, as opposed to most of the Maoist era, the prevailing view on S&T was relatively non-
ideological and very favourably disposed towards the scientific method: “science and technology were
seen as the centrepiece of China’s economic modernization strategy … (scientists) were asked to criticize
‘superstition’ … ‘feudalism’ … and the ‘feudal leftist’ legacy of the Maoist period …” (Miller, 1996: 184).
The  government  recognized  the  mutual  interdependency  of  scientific,  technological  and  economic
development, and acknowledged that a multi-layered technological structure would persist in China for
a long time yet. It also stated that the purpose of research on the technology of industrial and agricultural
production was to foster the development of cheaper and better commodities, and therefore it had to be
carried out to a large extent inside, or in cooperation with industrial enterprises, with a view to help
bridging the traditional gap between R&D institutions and productive firms.
25 
Yet, the institutional legacy in China at the beginning of the reform era was constituted by a Soviet-
type S&T planning apparatus, with its elements of strength and weakness. Its pillars were constituted by
a central research organization (the Academy of Sciences) and a system of military and sectoral R&D
institutes, with a high degree of concentration on a few, specific, defence-related research projects. The
realization that the main drawback of this defence-centred system was the failure to transfer effectively
to productive enterprises practical new knowledge prompted the implementation of a series of major
reforms,
26 aiming at encouraging the commercialization of research and its integration with production.
According to the officially endorsed theory, as China was a “socialist commodity economy”, the results
of R&D (i.e. designs, prototypes and know-how in general) were actually commodities as well, and as- 15 -
27 The  “financially  virtuous” character of these reforms, which aimed at improving the efficiency of R&D
structures  using  at  least  as much the stick as the carrot, explained to some extent why important results could be
achieved with limited resources. As is the case with all exclusively efficiency-minded policies, such an approach was
bound to show diminishing returns. Hence, from the beginning it was complemented by other initiatives, and by the
mid-1990s it was progressively substituted by a more bold R&D policy.
28 Science  parks  also  proliferated,  the  first  having  been  established by the Academy of Sciences in Shenzen.
They tend to be established in the framework of programmes sponsored at different governmental levels.
29 See Yu (1999: 199–207). It should be borne in mind that the success of this type of enterprise and its social
acceptability are related to its elite, vanguard character, and that its model cannot be naively transferred, for instance,
to the bulk of reforming SOEs.
30 The  increasing  commercial  orientation  of  scientific  laboratories  and the implementation of strategic S&T
programmes  are  not  the  only  avenues  through  which  China  is  fostering  technical  progress.  Other  important  channels
include  the  acquisition  of  foreign  technology via joint venture, licensing and coproduction arrangements, the
promotion  of  venture  capital  industry  to  channel  equity  investment  into  new  technology  start-ups, and the
encouragement of a larger role for R&D in industrial enterprises (mainly large SOEs) (Feigenbaum, 1999).
such it was legitimate for them to be traded among different agents. Budget allocations for most R&D
centres were reduced,
27 while their managerial and, partly, financial autonomy was enhanced, as they
were encouraged to sell their knowledge-intensive outputs. Various forms of markets and market-like
institutional  arrangements  to  facilitate  trade  in  “intellectual  commodities” were thus established.
Technology trade has expanded fast since the 1980s.
28
However, low prices for technology items and the fact that most technical purchasers were COEs
and  other  relatively  small  firms  appeared  to  show  that SOE demand for technology was below full
potential.  Partly  to  overcome  this  problem,  horizontal  cooperation between enterprises and research
institutions was encouraged, with initiatives coming from both sides. Consequently, not only did major
industrial enterprises create or strengthen their research departments, but also a new breed of small,
independent, technology-based firms started to spread, originating from the core of the traditional R&D
institutions set up by the state. Initially, they were all locally or state-owned, established by universities or
research centres; a typical example, which would later show great development potential, was the
founding of “electronic street” firms in Beijing. The present ownership structure of their physical assets
is  very  diversified,  but the strength of these high-technology firms consists in the scientific and
technological  excellence  of  their  limited  workforce, in their entrepreuneurial vocation and market-
orientation,  and  in  their  flexibility  in  adopting  aggressive and stimulating working and compensation
arrangements.
29 The commercialization of important sectors of the R&D apparatus, like similar market-
oriented developments in China and elsewhere, however, could only represent a partial solution.
30 The
close relations between R&D, production and markets constitute very positive developments, but they
could be somewhat counterbalanced by the risk that scientists might end up being too constrained by short-
term market pressures, spending most of their time and efforts acting as traders of second-hand imported
technology than as real scientists. The new commercial-oriented firms appear in fact to be effective in
delivering practical, innovation-oriented, S&T projects, but they focus essentially on medium-level S&T
fields, which do not need a major centralized commitment of resources and the planned coordination of
several institutional agents. The partial commoditization of R&D thus appears to fulfil an important task,
but it does not eliminate the need for a strengthened centralized R&D and S&T system focusing on the
most advanced technological areas (Suttmeier and Cao, 1999).- 16 -
31 Most  developing  countries  are  simply  too  poor  in  terms  of human and non-human capital, as well as too
institutionally  underdeveloped,  to  engage  in  even  quite  modest state-sponsored R&D and S&T programmes.
Moreover,  their  bargaining  power  vis-à-vis  TNCs  in  order  to  achieve technology transfers is negligible. As a result,
the technological gap between them and the industrialized world is constantly widening.
32 During the Mao era, non-agricultural R&D programmes were mainly geared to military purposes.
33 Even  with  the  cycles  and  disruptions  typical  of  Chinese history, five-year plans and long-term budget
allocations  have  always  supported  research  and  high  technology,  albeit  often  inefficiently.  By  the  early  1980s  China
could count on a large pool of scientists and on a sufficient infrastructural, and institutional base for R&D and S&T
endeavours, quite broad even geographically (Suttmeier, 1993).
34 This  figure refers to a relatively restrictive definition of S&T and R&D activities ( China  Statistical
Yearbook,  2000).  The  much  higher  figure  for  R&D  personnel  reported in table 10 for the sake of international
comparison is from a different source (EIU, 2000) and evidently refers to a less restrictive definition of R&D.
B.  The quantitative and qualitative growth of the national R&D system
In the most advanced countries the core of the R&D and of most downstream innovation-generating
activities has been shifting increasingly towards large private corporations and has become progressively
more market-driven, although the direct and indirect role of the state is still far from negligible (OECD,
1998: 294). Conversely, in less advanced countries at an intermediate level of development
31 the role of
national S&T policies and of centralized R&D and innovation systems can be of paramount importance.
Among developing countries, China is one of the few in a position to engage effectively in planned
nationwide R&D endeavours. Even if only a tiny fraction of the young Chinese reach graduate and
postgraduate education, university enrolment is sizeable in absolute terms, having increased from 2 million
in 1990 to over 3 million by the late 1990s (China Statistical Yearbook, 2000). China has a large number
of good quality scientists and engineers and a long experience in high-tech programmes, which have been
carried out since the 1950s
32 mainly for military purposes.
33 In the late 1990s, almost 3 million scientists,
engineers and other personnel were engaged in China in S&T
34 (tables 7 and 8), corresponding to more
than 40 per cent of the total for all developing countries and almost 10 per cent of the world total
(UNCTAD, 1999b). While the number of S&T institutions has decreased since the mid-1990s, according
to the policy goals of rationalizing and focusing more sharply the research effort, the number of scientists,
engineers and other personnel engaged directly in S&T activities has been steadily increasing, as has the
funding for research and, marginally, the R&D/GDP ratio. Beyond those involved in S&T proper, many
other professional workers  (over 20 millions in 1999) are engaged in various engineering and teaching
activities in SOEs and other institutions. This figure almost duplicates that of 1990 and quadruplicates that
of 1980 (table 7). In relative terms (number of scientists and engineers in R&D per million population;
R&D spending/GDP) China’s R&D effort ranks still far lower than that of the Republic of Korea and
Taiwan Province of China, but it is higher on average than that of Latin American countries (table 10; see
also UNCTAD, 1999b).
In  a  complementary  fashion  with  respect  to  indigenous  R&D  efforts,  imports  of  machines  are
another avenue through which a developing country can accede to the world’s technology pool (see
footnote 5). China’s imports of machines and transport equipment increased threefold in the 1980s and
over fourfold in the 1990s (table 11).
Data on R&D outputs appear to show a more marked improvement than those on R&D inputs,
suggesting that the efficiency-enhancing reforms carried out since the 1980s have been rather successful.- 17 -
Table 7
Scientific and technical personnel in SOEs and institutions
(Millions of people)
1980 1990 1995 1999
Total 5.3 10.8 19.1 21.4
Engineering 1.9 5.1 5.6 5.7
Scientific research 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Teaching 1.2 2.1 9.6 11.5
Sources: SSB (2000).
Table 8
Basic statistics on national scientific and technological activities
1995 1998 1999
Number of S&T institutions (per 1000) 25 22.1 22.2
Number of personnel engaged in S&T
   activities (per 10,000) 262.5 281.4 290.6
   •   Scientists and engineers 155.4 149 159.5
Funding for S&T (billions of yuan) 96 129 146
Expenditure for S&T (billions of yuan) 84.5 112.8 128.5
R&D/GDP (percentage) 0.6 0.7 0.8
Sources: SSB (2000).
The  number  of  published  scientific  and  engineering papers increased strongly over the 1990s. The
percentage of these articles which has been catalogued in an international index has more than doubled,
and China’s ranking in science and engineering publishing activities has improved sharply (table 9). The
number of patents and the transaction value in technical markets have increased manyfold (table 11).
Partly as a result of these S&T advancements, China’s share of high-technology exports in the total of
manufactured exports compares rather favourably to those of other developing and developed countries
(table 10).
C.  Increased awareness of the strategic role of science and technology
By the late 1990s, the impact of the latest wave of technological revolution in the West and its
military implications made obvious by the Gulf and the Yugoslavian wars have prompted Chinese leaders
to accord an even higher priority to the strengthening of the country’s research and innovation capabilities
(Suttmeier and Cao, 1999).- 18 -
Table 9
China: R&D and technology indicators
1990 1995 1997
Number of patents applied 41,469 83,045 114,208
Exports of high-technology products
(US$ millions) 2,686 10,091
Scientific papers published:
•  (1) domestically 88,723 107,991 120,851
•  (2) catalogued in an international index 13,183 26,395 35,300
• (1) / (2) percentage       15.0  24.0  34.0
1981–87 1988–93 1995 1997
(rank) (rank)
                                                  
China’s percentage share of all
scientific articles in science and
engineering research 0.5 1.1 -- --
China’s share of research papers
catalogued in the Science Citation Index 1.5 15 12
China’s share of research papers
catalogued in the Engineering Citation Index 4.8 7 4
Sources: SSB (2000); OECD (1998); Suttmeier and Cao (1999).
Table 10
S&T indicators: China and other countries
Rep. of
China USA Japan Korea Germany India Brazil
Personal computers per
1000 people, 1998 8.9 459 237 157 305 2.7 30
Internet hosts per 10,000
people, January 2000 0.57 1,940 209 60 208 1 26
Scientists & engineers in R&D
(in thousands), 1987–1997 454 3,676 4,909 2,193 2,831 149 168
R&D expenditure/GDP,
mid-1990s 0.6 2.6 -- 2.7 -- -- --
High-technology exports as a
percentage of manufactured
goods exports, 1998 15 33 26 27 14 5 9
Patents applications – filed by
residents (in thousands), 1997 13 126 351 93 62 10 --
Sources: EIU (2000).- 19 -
Table 11
China: other scientific and technological indicators
1980 1990 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
                                                              
A.  Imports of machines and
transport equipment
(US$ 100 million) 51.2 168.4 526.4 547.6 527.7 567.7 694.53
1992 1995 1998 1999
                                   
B.  Transaction value in
technical market
(billions of yuan) 15.08 28.83 43.58 52.34
1981–85 1990 1995 1998 1999
                                                
C.  Total patents granted 138 22,588 45,064 67,889 100,156
Sources: SSB (2000); EIU (2000).
A crucial component of China’s multifaceted S&T policy is constituted by strategic technology
programmes. They have received since 1987 the largest share of direct central government finance for
R&D in priority sectors (such as space, laser and supercomputing) through a unique set of procedures
and institutional arrangements. They focus on applied research and medium-term results and concentrate
the efforts of the country’s best technicians and planners. As they represents an explicit link between
national security and development issues, technology programmes have been vigorously promoted by elite
military-technical cadres, with the aim of widening China’s initial narrow focus on weapon building into
a comprehensive strategic technology effort.
The pivotal role of strategic S&T programmes is consistent with a long-run trend. Already by the
late 1970s, as the new Dengist development strategy was counting on a long period of peace and shifted
priorities towards the development of the civilian economy, renewed contacts with the outside world led
military and scientific cadres to realize China’s retarded economic development, not only with respect to
the modest technological level of the country’s economy, but also to the management of the entire S&T
system. The military themselves realized the “growing interdependence between defence technology and
commercial innovation” (Feigenbaum, 1999:100–101). There was an increasing awareness that in the
United States and the West improvements in R&D and technology had come about mainly through an
increasingly  civilian-focused  process.  However,  while  opening  a  number  of  other  channels for less
strategic forms of R&D and technological innovations consistent with the market-oriented reforms in the
overall Chinese economy, high-level cadres with military experience still accorded priority to state planning
and target setting. The key task was not so much the conversion of the S&T apparatus towards civilian
use, but the creation of institutions conducive to multiple-use diffusion, according to the multiple-use nature
of modern technologies. Primarily non-defence R&D could eventually ease the transfer process and help
in building a cooperative managerial infrastructure.
This strategic focus depended to a large extent on the realization that China’s severe limits in R&D
funding made it necessary to concentrate them effectively on limited areas, and this goal could better be- 20 -
35 These  developments  in  the  state-run, top-level R&D system were taking place, while in other areas most
R&D  and  innovation  activity  of  less-than-high-technological  level  was  being  devolved  to  decentralized  market-
oriented non-state agents (see subsection IV.A).
36 In  October,1996 China approved a Law on Accelerating the Commercialization of S&T Research Results.
37 The  MOST  also  supports  the  transfer  of  technology  from the defence sector, which has been mandated
to  assist  the  development of the civilian economy through various channels, including the restructuring of entire
plants.
achieved through planning, i.e. via non-market means. Arguments similar to the familiar Western ones of
market failure and economies of scale, strengthened by the high level of uncertainty, the bulky nature of
investment in comprehensive top-level research projects and the length of R&D cycles led leaders to
reaffirm the necessity for state support for key programmes. This support had to be provided at the central
level, as local and provincial governments were being pushed too strongly by the impact of the reforms
towards short-term, market-oriented policies, and would not have reaped enough benefits from initiatives
of national interest. An ad hoc institutional framework evolved for these large programmes, in which top
politicians would cooperate directly with technicians and commit large resources, yet would respect the
primacy of technical solutions (Feigenbaum, 1999).
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D.  The major S&T programmes
The main institution responsible for the elaboration, planning and coordination of strategic R&D and
technology programmes is presently the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), born of the recent
restructuring  of  the  State  Science  and  Technology  Commission  (SSTC). The SSTC was a central
government agency responsible for the nation’s science and technology activities (Chang, 1996), with the
ultimate aim of fostering economic and social development. Besides promoting research and formulating
plans  to  reform  the  nation’s  R&D  management  system,  SSTC  (now  MOST)  has  to  foster the
“commercialization, industrialization and globalization of scientific and technological achievements … to
administer the management of the national high technology industry development zones … to formulate
policies laws and regulations regarding technology markets, to supervise the implementation of the Law
of Technology Contracts … to maintain secrecy and intellectual property rights … to formulate strategies
and policies on international science and technology exchange and cooperation … to organize, jointly with
other departments concerned, the export of technologies, the introduction of foreign technologies and
related assimilation and innovation” (Chang, 1996: 10–11).
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MOST promotes and coordinates three major types of actions:
37 basic R&D (centred around the
National Programme for Key Basic Research Projects); activities aimed at tackling major S&T problems
relevant  to  economic  development,  in  order  to  accelerate  technological innovation and product
regeneration in traditional industries (which includes the Spark programme for the rural economy and a
national programme for key S&T projects), as well as initiatives focused on the development of high and
emerging technologies and high-technology industries. Some of the main programmes in the latter domain
are the national high technology R&D programmes and the Torch programme, initiated in 1988 to promote
commercialization and industrialization of key high-technology projects through the market mechanisms.
The Torch is a sort of umbrella that directs the development of high and new technology industries,
focusing mainly on the electronics sector, in which China has acquired a certain expertise. It promotes
product innovations and the creation of high-technology industry development zones, with the aim of- 21 -
38 Informal contacts between former military cadres and top politicians, including Deng himself, helped to give
863 priority and funds (Feigenbaum, 1999).
applying R&D to production and commercialization. Due to the characteristics of the electronics sector,
medium-level R&D projects requiring moderate funding might lead relatively quickly to the stages of
production and commercialization Consistently, especially in the initial phase, the programme was designed
to support essentially SMEs, not big SOEs. Among the various projects carried out in the framework of
the Torch programme, those implemented in cooperation with the sprawling new cluster of electronic
SMEs in Beijing (which is now spreading to other parts of the country) appear to be particularly promising,
as  these  firms  pool  a  large  entrepreneurial  and  scientific  potential.  With  the  support  of  the  Torch
programme, some of the former small firms have grown into large industrial groups, as is the case for the
well-known Legend Computer Company (Yu, 1999:188).
The National High Technology Research and Development Programme (commonly referred to as
863), launched in March 1986, came to acquire paramount relevance, as it represents an important step
forward in strategic S&T planning. The 15-year-old 863 programme is an example of state-centred, yet
flexible and articulate approach to the quest for high technology, which is being implemented side by side
with other initiatives relying on decentralized entrepreneurship and market signals. It focuses on seven key
R&D-intensive fields – automation, biotechnology, energy, information technology, lasers, new materials
and space technology – with the aim of promoting their accelerated development and maximizing the
results obtained from pooling together all national resources. The 863 programme is national and quite
centralized, but it coordinates several institutions at different levels and tries to apply pragmatically both
the bottom-up approach to project selection (US style) and the top-down approach (Japanese style). It
concentrates on applied science as a means to achieve long-range economic competitiveness, but it also
assigns some resources to selected areas of basic research, aiming to achieving a symbiosis between
science, engineering and industrialization.
The proponents of 863 argued that high technology had to become the focus of China’s long-range
development, and the selected sectors were chosen because they were integral to many “system-level”
industries,  relying  on  traditional  military  concepts such as “concentration of forces” and “unified
command” to pursue a big push in a non-military direction.
38 In spite of the programme’s obvious political
relevance, scientists have managed to maintain most of the decision-making process governed by technical
criteria. Competition among various R&D institutions for 863 funds also appears to be working. Expert
groups  make  most  technical  but  also  financial decisions, through a specific institutional mechanism
different  from  the  usual  bureaucratic  channels,  which  is  proving managerially more effective. These
expert groups have thus been allowed by politicians a large share of effective autonomy, “insulation” and
real power, in a manner similar to that of planners in the developmental states of East Asia.
The  863  programme is a power structure aimed at cooperation-based avenues to solve critical
problems  of  industrial  modernization  in  a  centralized  framework,  and  is  having  a  huge  organizational
influence on the whole state-directed R&D system. By the mid-1990s the programme’s organization,
which was initially relatively informal, had been progressively superseded by a more institutionalized and
less vertically hierarchical mechanism, based on several national research centres. The institutional
structure  is  such that intra- and inter-level communication is relatively fluid, and the top technical
leadership is strongly committed to the programme and (informally) vested with limited proprietary rights.
This highly strategic programme has contributed to achieving important scientific and industrial results in- 22 -
39 Recent  industrial  reforms  aiming  at  consolidating  large  SOEs  and  strengthening  their R&D activities appear
to be heading in the right direction.
several advanced fields – although its main purpose is still to keep China abreast of top-level international
R&D – some of which are now being commercialized (Chang, 1996). Among these results, the single
most successful example has been the development of the Shuguang 1000 large-scale parallel computer
and the Shuguang Tianchao supercomputer systems, realized jointly by the State Computer Research and
Development Centre and by Shuguang Information Industrial Ltd (Yu, 1999: 147).
Even if it represents the most advanced and ambitious component, the 863 programme is only one
element of a multifaceted S&T policy which relies on a multiplicity of instruments and also of sectoral
development philosophies. China’s S&T policy applies a mixed and flexible approach, trying to “walk on
two legs”. In the fields of top-level technology and world-frontier research it accords priority to centrally
coordinated, state-sponsored, targeted R&D programmes. Conversely, in those fields belonging to the
lower levels of the technological spectrum, it leaves to decentralized, entrepreneurial, directly market-
oriented agents most of the initiatives and the incentives to promote technical progress. Chinese planners
“recognize the limits … of targeted industrial policies … the S&T reforms of the 1980s and 1990s (have
brought up) significant institutional changes designed to introduce markets, promote  entrepreneurialism
… and use … government (intervention) to foster an environment conducive to innovation” (Feigenbaum,
1999: 123).
E.  The new focus of S&T policies: achievements, limits, and potential
In the 1990s the thrust of China’s S&T policies became more bold. It was recognized that the
pragmatic drive prevailing in the 1980s had gone too far, and that too low a profile had been kept in such
areas as basic research and high technology. In fact, notwithstanding the headway achieved so far, China
still has a long way to go on this path. The Chinese economic system is largely non-innovative, and a
national technology market is yet in an embryonic, if promising, stage. R&D at the enterprise level is still
weak, even in relative terms: in China only about 30 per cent of R&D is carried out by enterprises,
compared to 70–80 per cent in the United States (Feigenbaum, 1999; Yu, 1999).
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The government has not only emphasized more and more the key role of technology in promoting
economic development, but it has also shifted to some extent its goals and priorities in a more ambitious
direction.  Trying  to  go  beyond  the  progress  already  made,  it  focused on the establishment of the
foundations of a national S&T system capable of realizing scientific and technological breakthroughs in
frontier, high-technology fields (Yu, 1999). The new strategy is founded on a more mature understanding
of the S&T apparatus as a means to improving the overall national system of innovation, taking fully into
account  the  position  of  China  vis-à-vis  the  outside  world. Increased emphasis is being put on the
professionalization  of  research  activities,  on  the  enhancement  of  the  economic and social role of
innovators, and on the effort to harness the vast scientific potential represented by the large community
of Chinese researchers working overseas. Resources are to be concentrated on a limited set of targets
under the highest policy direction, and horizontal international research cooperation with public and private
foreign partners is being actively promoted (Suttmeier and Cao, 1999).
A major step in shaping the new S&T strategy was the 1995 National Science Conference, which
ended with the approval of the Decision to Accelerate the Development of Science and Technology. The- 23 -
Decision, besides stressing the highest political priority accorded to scientific development, set a significant
quantitative target: gross expenditure on R&D was set to reach 1.5 per cent of GDP by the year 2000.
This policy line was confirmed at the Fifteenth Party Congress in 1997 and at the National People’s
Congress meetings in 1999, as well as in the statements of top government leaders. Consequently, the
amount of resources devoted to S&T has continued to grow. However, in relative terms, the goal of
substantially increasing the R&D/GDP ratios and the proportion of R&D activities carried out directly by
productive enterprises has not yet been met.
The data discussed in subsection IV.B suggest that China’s progress has been quite remarkable, with
respect both to the country’s recent past and to its positioning on the world technological ladder and in the
international division of labour. China is no longer just a producer of labour-intensive, low-tech
manufactures. Owing largely to the size effect, by the end of the millennium China’s overall international
ranking in terms of R&D outputs was roughly in line with its ranking as an exporter (i.e. among the
world’s 10–15 top nations), notwithstanding its much less satisfactory relative position in terms of the
development of the educational system. While in less than a decade China’s high-technology exports,
patents and internationally recognized scientific papers have multiplied by two or threefold, university
enrolment has increased only by 50 per cent and the number of R&D personnel has risen quite marginally.
These non-homogeneous trends show that important results have been achieved so far mainly by means
of an improvement in the efficiency of the country’s S&T system, as the R&D and educational inputs
have been growing roughly at the (indeed fast) pace of the country’s overall economy. A true knowledge-
based  revolution  in  terms  of  mass  access  to  higher education and of a substantial increase in the
economy’s R&D intensity – as has already occurred in the West and in a handful of Asian NICs – has
yet to take place in China. If such a phenomenon happens, in another generation China will be one of the
first two or three world scientific and technological powers.
V.  ENTERPRISES AS KEY PLAYERS IN THE TECHNICAL PROGRESS-
GENERATING PROCESS: SOEs AND COEs UP TO THE LATE 1990s
A.  Enterprise autonomy in the state and collective industrial sectors
In the preceding section the importance of state-planned R&D and especially of strategic technology
programmes has been emphasized. However, in a reforming socialist economy like China, as in any other
complex  modern  economy,  the  focal  locus  of  technical  progress generation is the enterprise, the
organization in which in-firm or externally generated new knowledge is applied to market-oriented and/or
market-compatible  production  and  eventually  commercialized.  In  the  theoretical  framework  of  the
evolutionary approach, productive enterprises should be considered an integral part of the broadly defined
NSI, as one of the mutually interacting subsystems in which learning and innovation take place (Lundvall,
1992).
In China, SOEs, and to a lesser extent COEs, must consult with several other local and sometimes
central agencies, to have their decisions administratively ratified. Although higher planning or sectoral
specialized agencies do exist and often interact with them, and extensive consultations with other bodies
and institutions are common, enterprises are increasingly in charge of final and important decisions in the
domains of technology acquisition and implementation of productive innovations, utilizing their comparative- 24 -
40 Research  carried  out  in  advanced  capitalist  countries  on  concrete  case  stories, such as Toyota in Japan or
large  corporations  in  the  United  States,  shows  that  national  government commitments to technical progress and
overall  policy  efforts  aimed  at  S&T  development  are  far  from  irrelevant, but the “masters of change” tend to be
chiefly those in the “functional economic organizations – the industrial enterprise – that actually implement the new
process or product technologies” (Grow, 1993: 818; Kanter, 1983: 432; Brenner, 1987: xi–244).
41 Of  course,  as  a  general rule, COEs continue to have a higher degree of autonomy than SOEs. However,
especially if only large and medium-scale enterprises are taken into account, the relatively large size of COEs means
that  local  governments  acting  as  owners  cannot  ignore completely their impact on employment and ultimately on
the social fabric of the area in which they operate. Hence, managers of medium and large COEs are likely to face, even
if to a lesser extent, some kind of not purely economic demands from their principals, just like SOE managers.
42 Implementing  a  major  innovation,  for  instance,  might  have  a  non-negligible  impact  on  labour  organization
and  intensity,  the  skills  required  from  staff  and  its  internal hierarchy, and the employment level. Conversely, non-
implementation might jeopardize the very viability of the enterprise and lead to dramatic job losses.
43 For  instance,  Shinua  coal  company appears to have been strategically weakened by a forced merger with
several smaller and inefficient mining enterprises (Nolan, 1999a).
informational advantages as final users of potentially valuable new knowledge (Grow, 1993). Taking into
account the substantive autonomy enjoyed by both COEs and SOEs, many firm-specific factors favouring
the effective acquisition of foreign technology – such as managerial capability, entrepreneurship, internal
communication and participation and flexibility – are common to all manager-run enterprises operating in
a regime of separation between ownership and control, quite independently of the ultimately public or
private nature of their principals.
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As a result of the increasing impact of industrial reforms, managers of medium and large enterprises
in both subsectors of China’s socialist industry
41 enjoy a high level of autonomy, not very different from
that  of  their  counterparts  in  the  corporate  private  sector  of  the  advanced  capitalist countries. They
concentrate in their hands most of the decisional power and responsibilities related to the incentives and
risks of actual changes in the production and distribution processes. While scientists in the R&D laboratory
can  to  some  extent  be  isolated  in  an  ivory  tower,  and  functionaries managing state-sponsored S&T
programmes deal only indirectly with firms, managers responsible for the implementation of innovations
live directly the social and economic consequences of their actions (or inaction).
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As far as they act as agents of principals exclusively or fundamentally interested in economic and
financial goals, managers of publicly owned enterprises tend to behave like capitalist managers vis-à-vis
the risks and opportunities related to technology choices. When, on the other hand, principals over-impose
on managers a different kind of agenda, motivated by strategic, social or political issues, the managers’
behaviour necessarily changes. By the late 1990s this situation, though far from uncommon, was tending
to become the exception rather than the rule.
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By  and  large, Chinese industrial managers appear to be sufficiently motivated to acquire new
technology, promote in-firm R&D, improve their staff’s technical skills, and apply to production both
product and process innovations, as they see it as a way to thrive and realize profits in an increasingly
competitive  market.  The  managers’  incentives structure is still being improved, and some important
changes are going to be implemented in the framework of the corporatization of a large part of the present
SOE sector.
At the level of the enterprise, therefore, reforms have already gone a long way to increase the
propensity of managers to foster technical progress, improving significantly on the previous passive stance- 25 -
44 Gradual  market-oriented  changes  appear  to follow a largely endogenous path, in which various institutional
agents  enjoying  positive  feedbacks  progressively contribute to the establishment of de facto constituencies
favourable to the prosecution of the reform process (Jefferson, Ping and Zhao, 1999).
45 In the period between the late 1980s and the early 1990s fiscal and financial subsidies to SOEs had also to
be  increased  as  a  compensatory  measure.  The  worsening  of  SOE  sector’s  overall financial situation continued up
to the late 1990s.
46 The author recognizes that his theory explains the relative efficiency of ambiguous property rights, not the
great  success  of  COEs.  So  he  conjectures:  “Can  the  unconventional  arrangements of ambiguous ownership be
justified  in  a  larger  context  than  market  imperfections?”  (Li,  1996:  16).  Our  view  is  that ambiguous property rights
contribute  to  overcome  to  some  extent  the  trade-off  between  efficiency  and public ownership of the means of
production, and that the latter has intrinsic advantages for capital accumulation (see subsection V.E).
of socialist managers in pre-reform times.
44 Most of the residual agenda of industrial reforms is focussed
on the “meso” level of industrial organization, which is to be shaped consistently with the main objectives
of strategic industrial and technological policies, in order to exploit fully the potential benefits stemming
from market-compatible planning and judicious centralized intervention. Enterprise autonomy, however,
can be limited or enhanced by the relation between managers, as agents, and their often multiple principals
and partners. Among public and quasi-public industrial enterprises, differences in size and in the level of
socialization of property rights are reflected in significant operational and behavioural differences. These
differences, however, do not prove the universal superiority of one specific type of public firm, and even
less the need for a generalized privatization of industrial enterprises. Rather, COEs and reforming SOEs
should be considered as distinct instruments to target different sections of the overall technological
spectrum, with the aim of maximizing the long-term rate of technical progress in the economy as a whole.
B.  The success of the collective sector: ambiguous
property rights and spillovers from SOEs
The results of industrial reforms so far appear to show a mixed picture. On the one hand, the SOE
sector output grew rather fast in quantitative terms, even if less rapidly than in the other industrial sectors.
On  the  other  hand,  the  sector  experienced  a  severe  financial  deterioration.
45  Conversely,  there  is  no
disputing the fact that not only production but also efficiency and productivity rose very fast in the
collective and private sectors of industry, as well as in agriculture, following the inception of reforms in
the  late  1970s  (see  section  VI).  It  would be incorrect to attribute these gains to a de facto quasi-
privatization process, which would have taken place in the collective industrial sector as it did before in
the domain of agriculture. Property rights in COEs are rather ambiguous, but remain substantially public,
like those of SOEs.
Ambiguous  property rights arise as an adaptation to an imperfect market environment and in
response to high transaction costs and uncertainties in the market place. Non-state firms, even if they are
founded  by  entrepreneurs, find it advantageous to team up with local governments because of the
existence  of  a “gray” market, which can be heavily altered by government intervention or inaction.
Ambiguity in tax rates and the ubiquity of negotiations also favour the joint running of the firm (Li, 1996).
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The persistence of a cooperative culture and of a common moral solidarity framework in rural Chinese
communities contributes to minimizing the dangers of this type of property rights arrangement (Byrd and
Lin, 1990; Jefferson, Mai and Zhao, 1999).
However, the relationship between local leaders (as principals) and managers (as agents) in running
COEs is undergoing continuous evolution (Chen and Rozelle, 1999). With the development of market- 26 -
47 The budget constraint is quite binding for COEs, but also in the collective sector it is not always entirely
hard. COEs often stay in business for a long time even if they are in the red, as was shown for instance by Wang
(1990) in a study on 100 rural firms. However, the potential for earmarking large subsidies to inefficient firms for very
long  periods,  leading  to  major  losses, is limited by the relatively modest size of local government finances. This
phenomenon can also be interpreted in the framework of the ambiguous property rights approach.
48 As in the state-owned sector, these firms tend to be more directly monitored by principals with respect to
ordinary  COEs,  showing  that their optimum governance requires a higher level of socialization of management,
besides purely ownership functions, and a higher degree of non-market coordination.
49 COEs  often  obtain  cheap  machinery  and  equipment  discarded  from  state  enterprises,  and many SOE
engineers  and  technicians  act  as  consultants for TVEs in order to obtain extra income. According to surveys, over
90 per cent of COEs cite SOEs as their main source of new technology (Jefferson et al., 1992).
50 Consistently with this finding, statistical data show that most small SOEs perform poorly, while large and
medium-scale SOEs tend to be successful (see subsection V.D).
51 According  to  a  recent econometric study, in the first period of agricultural reforms technical change
accounted  for  40  per  cent  of  increase  in  yield  of  rice,  more  than  institutional  change.  Afterwards,  technical  progress
contributed  to  virtually  all  yield  growth.  Thus,  improvements  in  incentive  coming  from  the  introduction  of  the  HRS
appear  to  have  been  a  one-off  event  (Huang  and  Rozelle,  1996).  This  finding  shows  that  it  would  be  wrong  to
overemphasize  the  benefits  of  decollectivization,  decentralization,  and commercialization, while overlooking the
problems  created  by  their  having  gone  too  far.  These  reforms  also  had  a  negative  impact, as they led to forgoing
several  advantages  of  the  previous  collectivized  system  in  terms  of  planning, distribution and execution of several
collective  tasks  (a  typical  example  is  the  deterioration  of  water management, which is crucial in particular for rice
production). With respect to the goal of accelerating technical progress, the reforms are likely to have improved
farmers’ incentive to adopt more profitable technologies. However, the supply of new technology via basic research,
which  was  rather  satisfactory in the pre-reform period, has somewhat deteriorated, owing to the partial breakdown
transactions and the proliferation of COEs, on the one hand, it has become increasingly cumbersome for
leaders to run firms without the help of specialized managers. On the other hand, their specific managerial
functions have become less needed, as managers can get inputs and other factors of production through
market channels. Thus, a tendency has arisen to delegate managerial functions to specialized agents, and
contracts have evolved favouring profit-sharing or leasing (fixed-payment) arrangements. The institutional
changes in the COE sector show that market development is leading to contractual arrangements which
resemble more closely those of private enterprises, albeit in a socialist property rights regime. If coupled
with increasingly tight budget constraints,
47 these changes increase the incentives for innovation among
agents in the collective sector. Changes in contractual arrangements for COEs are in fact a form of
institutional innovation which contributes to overall technical progress.
However, capital- and knowledge-intensive COEs tend to remain more directly controlled by leaders,
as they embody a higher share of social capital, which has often been obtained through non-market
channels from more technologically advanced enterprises, mostly SOEs.
48 Actually, COEs often profit
from an array of physical and human capital transfers from SOEs, arranged through ad hoc transactions
which create a kind of informal technology market at the local level (Fan, 1999). As such, markets would
not  exists  under  pure  laissez-faire  conditions,  the  existence  of  SOEs  allows  collective  enterprises  to
benefit from significant technological spillovers.
49 These spillovers contribute to explaining the superior
efficiency of COEs in low- and medium-technology industries, in which small-scale firms enjoy an
organizational comparative advantage (Murakami et al., 1994, 1996).
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C.  The two stages of SOE reform
The reform process in the state-owned industrial sector was initiated in the late 1970s. At first, it
focused mainly on the contract instrument, modelled after the household responsibility system (HRS),
which was considered by many observers as the key to the success of the agrarian reform.
51 - 27 -
of collective institutions, excessive decentralization, and in the pursuit of short-term marketable results. The state-run
rice  research  system,  which  had  been  very  successful during the in Mao era (new rice varieties were introduced in
China  in  the  1960s,  before  the  Green  Revolution),  thanks  in  part  to  its  almost  self-sufficient  character,  has  been
particularly affected.
52 The dual-track system withered progressively in favour of market allocation, although a few key prices are
still plan-determined.
53 Destatization is not synonymous with privatization, although the latter can be one of the tools of the former.
Reformers were thus targeting one major constraint to improved SOE performance, the managers’
(and, to a lesser extent, workers’) incentive structure, so as to enhance their autonomous power to take
strategic decisions. Decentralization of decision-making power to increasingly market-oriented productive
units was consistent with the gradual but thorough shift from plan to market coordination of production
and distribution relations which was taking place in the Chinese economy. While improving the agents’
(managers’) behavioural functions, however, the initial reforms failed to address the issue of modernizing
and diversifying the principals’ ownership structure in order to improve overall corporate governance, a
task which would have been at the centre of the second stage of industrial reforms since the mid-1990s.
The  Enterprise  Contract  Responsibility  System  (CRS),  which  specified  reciprocal  rights  and
obligations, pledges and targets, took several forms. A typical one was the “two guarantees and one
linkage” contract, in which the firm pledged to realize a certain level of tax and profits, and also to finance
the technical renovation required by the state with its own funds. These contracts became the norm by
the late 1980s. Moreover, SOEs could sell more and more output at market prices,
52 and could retain
profits for investment, welfare programmes and bonuses. These reforms strengthened the profit motive
and  also  the  “impetus  for technical progress and product innovation” (Lin et al.: 64). The contract
responsibility system strengthened the linkage between the firm’s performance and the prosperity of the
local government and/or other principals, and thus improved the incentives system. It achieved a reduction
in the softness of the budget constraint and helped to turn large SOEs towards profit. Conversely, poor-
performing SOEs were put under increasing pressure, as were their workers too. Some SOEs started to
try to get rid of the unprofitable parts of their businesses, and many fast-growing and fast-modernizing
large and medium-scale enterprises (LMEs) emerged under this system.
As a result of the partial reforms implemented during the first decade, it appears that the “internal”
incentive structure faced by SOE managers (and to some extent workers as well) in the late 1980s to
early 1990s was approaching that of COEs and of private enterprises, owing to the effectively enhanced
autonomy of enterprises and to the paramount priority assigned to the profit objective.
However, SOEs, which remained at the core of the advanced R&D and innovation effort of the
country’s industry and were endowed with the bulk of the most advanced physical and human capital,
were still burdened by another set of “external” constraints. The most serious of these constraints was
constituted by excessively high direct and indirect labour costs, stemming from the historical urban bias
of the state, the fragmentation of the labour market, the political strength of concentrated urban workers,
and the lack of alternative state-funded universal welfare systems. Moreover, non-strategic bureaucratic
interference, albeit less widespread, continued to be a problem.
The limited results obtained by the reforms prompted a lively discussion, which led to the adoption
of  a  partially  new  strategy  emphasizing efficiency improvements in large SOEs and a gradual
destatization
53 of non-strategic large SOEs and of most medium and small ones. Moreover, the remaining- 28 -
54 According  to  Eyraud  (1999),  SOEs  are  no  longer “total social institutions” and are progressively becoming
purely economic entities.
55 The  state  intends  to  maintain  a  controlling  share  ownership  in  the  pillar industries and in key enterprises
in the basic industries, as well as in many strategic enterprises in high-technology sectors.
56 In some very heavy industries, like steel, contracting survived also de jure.
57 Huang  et  al.  (1999a)  acknowledge  an  improvement  in  the  new  reform  strategy,  recognizing  that  it  provides
local government with the incentive and autonomy for adopting different approaches.
58 According to Jefferson (1998), the emergence of a property-rights market in which public agents voluntarily
engage  in  efficiency-enhancing transactions is consistent with the theoretical approach pioneered by Coase (1960).
state enterprises were to concentrate on economic goals, while their traditional social functions would be
progressively shifted to external welfare systems.
54
The  “grasping  the  big  and  enlivening  the  small”  strategy  was launched originally in 1994. The
Thousand-Firm Reinvigoration Programme, which envisaged the maintenance of an enhanced SOE status
for about 1000 large SOEs, along with a number of measures aimed at ensuring their autonomy and
promoting technical upgrading and the full exploitation of economies of scale, constitutes the core of the
ongoing reform initiatives implemented since the second part of the decade (Jefferson, Mai and Zhao,
1999).
55 The CRS system was formally ended in 1994, with a view to replacing it with the new system
of joint-stock companies. In practice, as usual, their lot was one of continuity, with important negotiations
still going on between principals and agents
56 However, the process of ownership diversification in large
SOEs, did proceed albeit gradually. By the late 1990s, it was in full steam, and was beginning to allow
transcending the limits of the previous forms of ownership and operation, as boards of directors and
shareholders acted as a cushion again excessive ad hoc bureaucratic intervention.
Under the new system enterprise owners are a multiplicity of institutions, which usually include the
local government, the relevant ministry or quasi-ministerial body, other domestic institutional shareholders,
and often a foreign joint venture partner and thus foreign shareholders. Different players have partially
different agendas, but their interaction can contribute to the firm’s performance in a more flexible way
than in the past (Broadman, 1999).
57 Policy initiatives targeted at the  other side of the SOE spectrum,
aimed at terminating state tutelage on non-strategic SOEs, include the establishment of 150 property rights
transaction centres. In these centres different types of enterprises can trade reciprocally in their firm-
specific assets, with the goal of reaching an improved match of human and physical resources in a market-
driven fashion (Jefferson, Mai and Zhao, 1999).
The cumulative impact of various policy initiatives – which to a large extent are not the result of a
top-down planning approach but arise endogenously as a byproduct of the growth and development needs
of the enterprises system – is beginning to constitute a relevant qualitative change in the very nature of
public ownership, with several public owners interacting and negotiating reciprocally in a contestable
property-rights  market.  In  this  market  public  agents  must  take  into  account  the  opportunity  cost of
managing  directly their industrial assets vis-à-vis the alternative option of negotiating with other
enterprises, institutions or individual entrepreneurs which may be able to use them more productively. As
a result, relatively spontaneous market mechanisms can help improve incentives and resource allocation,
without necessitating withdrawal from the ultimately public nature of the ownership of most industrial
assets (Jefferson, 1998).
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59 Funds earmarked for SOE restructuring are estimated at about 30 billion yuan each year in 1996 and 1997,
and 40 billion yuan in 1998 (Gao and Yao, 1999).
60 The weak control power of smallholders may be beneficial to the firm, as smallholders tend to act
opportunistically and in a short-term speculative manner.
61 Studies conducted in the United States and other OECD economies show s a positive correlation between
shareholding of large investors and firm performance, as a result of institutional investors’ superior monitoring
ability with respect to atomized individual shareholders.
62 The  superiority  of  “legal  persons”  as corporate governance agents is related to their relatively higher
degree  of  autonomy, insulation and market-orientation with respect to traditional bureaucratic and ministerial bodies.
According  to  Xu  and  Wang  (1999:  94)  industrial  reforms  in  China  “seem  to  have  improved  the  economic  efficiency
of  the  state  sector”,  but  still  “the  internal  incentive  structure of SOEs must be reformed by diversifying the state
ownership and by introducing other forms of large shareholders, including institution investors”. However, under
special  but  sometimes  crucial  circumstances,  where  long-term strategic planning in ambitious high-technology
ventures  can  be the only hope for technological leapfrogging, a higher degree of centralization and of non-market
coordination may be necessary.
Actual implementation of the reform strategy was at best partial up to the late 1990s, but it appears
to have accelerated since 1998–1999, taking into account practical policy actions implemented and the
emphasis accorded to the issue in the official political discourse (OECD, 2000). The process of dissolving
inefficient SOEs through mergers and bankruptcies, sharing costs among central and local government
and banks, has been initially very slow and contradictory. Since 1996, the central government has been
channelling into the restructuring process huge sums of money,
59 with less than fully satisfactory results.
Some firms have been declared bankrupt and then reopened under a new name, shifting losses onto state
banks (Gao and Yao, 1999). Money-losing enterprises are sectorally and geographically concentrated in
mature  heavy  industries  and  also  in  textiles,  many  of  which  are  in  north-west  China.  Practical and
technical difficulties in the actual application of the bankruptcy law have in recent years prompted a shift
of emphasis towards the corporatization of SOE debt, consistently with the ongoing reform focus on SOE
corporatization and ownership diversification. Domestic institutions participating in the process include
stock companies, non-bank financial institutions and SOEs with at least one non-state owner. State shares
belong to the central government, the local government, and other SOEs, although legally their ultimate
owner is the State Council. Besides domestic institutional investors, share quotas in listed companies can
also be owned by foreign investors, employees and other individuals.
Principal-agent problems do arise with representatives of the state ministries, but tend to be less
intense with agents operating in financial institutions, while small shareholders are dispersed and exercise
little control power.
60 Legal person shareholders in China are not only better motivated but also better
equipped, as they are elected on the board of directors and hence have greater access to information.
They can effectively ensure “that managers work in the interest of shareholders through direct control.
Sitting on the board … they are able to change the management team … [they] have played a positive
role in monitoring the management and improving the firm’s performance” (Xu and Wang, 1999: 91–92).
A diversified ownership structure appears to constitute an advancement with respect to traditional vertical
and bureaucratic state ownership. However, excessive dispersion of ownership is to be avoided. In China,
as in the West, there appears to be a positive and significant correlation between ownership concentration
and profitability (Xu and Wang, 1999), as only large shareholders have sufficient incentive and ability to
effectively exercise monitoring rights, as they can reap benefits.
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Hence,  it  appears that corporate governance in the reforming SOE sector can best be assured
through an optimum level of intermediation, in which “legal persons” – specialized public financial and
governance institutions isolated from day-to-day political processes – play a pivotal role.
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63 These  figures  also  indicate  that  industrial  output  not  only  increased  very fast in informal, mostly
individually owned firms (see section VI), but also in village-level COEs. Most of these micro-enterprises are located
in rural areas.
64 Small COEs fared no worse than the larger COEs.
65 The results of this survey depict the situation prevailing in the late 1980s and early 1990s. The subsequent
acceleration  of  the  reforms  and  of  the  country’s opening up has multiplicated the chances for many enterprises of
any  type to gain access to advanced technology, and as a result there are now several COEs which have grown
larger  and  technologically sophisticated. However, the bulk of frontier innovation activity is still carried out in the
large SOE sector.
66 A  recent  OECD  study  acknowledges  “several  important  strengths” in China’s economic reform process.
It also notes that the reforms have been particularly deep and bold in larger SOEs, while problems of other enterprise
sectors have received less attention (OECD, 2000: 103–104).
D.  The key role of large SOEs
Since the early 1990s the share of total industrial output produced by SOEs fell below 50 per cent
and is now less than one third of the total. However, if firm size is considered, LMEs – most of them
SOEs  –  outperformed small-scale enterprises. In 1980–1993, LME share in total industrial output
increased from 42 to 46 per cent. If the formal sector of the industry alone is considered (all townships
and above, as well as independently accounting industrial enterprises), the increase is higher, from 43 to
56 per cent
63 (Lo, 1999). Clearly, small SOEs accounted for most if not all of the relative decline of the
whole state sector;
64 conversely, the performance of medium and large SOEs has been on average as
good as that of COEs.
Even before the beginning of the new phase of the new reform round in the second half of the 1990s,
state-owned LMEs were able to achieve good results in terms of production and sales, not only owing to
their superior command of physical, human and financial capital, but also as a result of their extensive
engagement in innovative activities. A national survey conducted in 1992 showed that over 90 per cent
of LMEs were carrying out some form of product or process innovation, and more than 50 per cent were
implementing major innovations (Ma and Zhao, 1993). A more selective and thorough survey carried out
in the early 1990s confirmed that reforms had achieved the goal of creating new links between profits and
employee compensation and that all types of enterprises (SOEs as well as urban and rural COEs) enjoyed
a  higher  degree  of  autonomy.  The  survey  also  showed  that  the  more technically advanced SOEs
concentrated most resources on innovation, as well as technicians and R&D expenditures, while smaller
COEs tended to be more financially constrained in their innovative activities. In relative terms, COEs
earmarked to innovation a larger share of their output than did state enterprises, but the bulk of innovation
expenditure  was  concentrated  among  the  largest  SOEs.  The  latter  engaged  in  frontier  R&D  and
innovation activities, while COEs acted rather as technological followers, with their innovative efforts
consisting mainly of imitating and catching up with SOE superior technology. Large SOE innovations were
less numerous but more important than COE innovations, and their contribution to total profit was greater
(Jefferson et al., 1997).
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These trends suggest that the performance of the subsector of big, large-scale SOEs has been quite
satisfactory, as opposed to that of small SOEs, and provides support to the policy of “grasping the big,
enlivening  the  small”,  which  is  presently  being  implemented.  state-owned  LMEs  are  “at  the  heart  of
China’s transformed Soviet-type economy” (Lo, 99: 694).
66 A proper combination of planning and market- 31 -
67 The  process  of  industrial  enterprise  corporatization  is  most  advanced  among  large  SOEs,  and  a  complex
web  of  public  ownership is being created, with corporate governance jointly carried out by more and more layers
of reformed and new quasi-state institutions. 
68 In promoting institutional and organizational modernization of large SOEs, China is to some extent following
and  developing  on  the  previous  experiences  of  other  East  Asian  “developmental”  or  “entrepreneurial” economies.
69 Well-known  examples  of  very  successful  SOEs  in  other  newly  industrialized  Asian  countries are those of
Posco (in the Republic of Korea) and China Steel (in Taiwan Province of China) (Nolan, 1999b).
70 China  has  established  a  footing  also  in  the  very  advanced  and  monopolistic  aerospace and aircraft
industries,  although  it  is  far  from  being  able  to  manufacture  aeroplanes  on  a  self-sufficiently  basis  (Nolan, 1999c).
coordination based on an upgraded form of state ownership
67 – a fortiori in a large developing country
such as China – can offer important advantages in concentrating the effort for technological modernization
in the most advanced, capital- and knowledge-intensive industrial sectors. The overall tendency is not
leaning towards privatization but in the direction of pluralized institutional ownership (Nolan and Wang,
1999), with managerial autonomy counterbalanced to some extent by the strong interest of local and also
national officials in the firms’ performance. As national governance institutions are in the best position to
bargain with TNCs for technical transfers, this institutionally new form of state intervention presents
important  strategic  advantages.
68  Furthermore,  large  SOEs  can  be  a  key  component  of  a  balanced
development path, with light and heavy industries growing aside (Nolan, 1996). In this context, large SOEs,
even if in a diversified ownership institutional framework, achieve economies of scale and scope, acting
as  long-term  oriented  market-supplanting  institutions,  while  more  directly  market-oriented  small  and
medium COEs benefit indirectly from their symbiosis with SOEs.
The  good  performance  of the LME subsector of SOEs provides support to the institutionalist
perspective of the late industrialization literature. Imperfect markets can usefully be matched by imperfect
property rights, and consequently by a set of specific institutions and organizations. Large SOEs have been
able to prosper in a framework consisting of the “collective learning paradigm” literature, which argues
that in the context of late industrialization entrepreneurship is largely a collective phenomenon,
69 with
internal agents (managers, workers) and major external partners (including to a certain extent political
bodies which also act as stakeholders) interacting virtuously through relations which are not exclusively
market-based (Amsden, 1989; Aoki, 1990; Naughton, 1994; Nolan, 1999b).
Another interesting phenomenon is constituted by the progressive emergence of large chaebol-like
SOE  groups.  Among  the  most  successful  examples are those of Sanjiu and Shougang. The Sanjiu
pharmaceutical group grew out of a firm belonging to the army, which developed strategically an initial
comparative advantage in the field of traditional Chinese medicine. Shougang, the second largest steel
producer in China, has been particularly successful in pursuing long-term strategic goals instead of short-
term  profits.  Thriving state-owned industrial groups are found in other heavy sectors such as
petrochemicals, and motor vehicles, and also in light industries such as beverages and household electric
appliances (Nolan, 1996).
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The formation of these conglomerates, which typically have at their core a large SOE with an
interest in upgrading technologically its junior partners and controlling the quality of their supplies, often
involves a process of mergers and acquisitions (M&A). M&A can be of a “defensive” nature, with the
state mandating a large SOE to absorb and reorganize a smaller ailing one. Not surprisingly, this top-down
process is not always efficient (Nolan, 1999a). Conversely, other M&A are bottom-up processes
emerging from the initiative of a successful and dynamic large SOE, resulting in practice in takeovers. Due- 32 -
71 According to Nolan and Wang (1999), the “big” industrial groups which are emerging in China are still too
“small” to compete with real TNC giants (only in employment are they comparable in size). Mergers of two or more
large SOEs could create industrial giants of sufficient strength to really compete globally, and the state should
actively contribute to this concentration process, as it has elsewhere in Asia.
72 The  government  maintains  that  “public  ownership”  remains  “a dominant feature of the economy” (Tam,
1999:  15).  It  is  becoming  increasingly  common  that  foreign  (more rarely, national) private investors also share
property rights in corporatized ex-SOEs. Apart from the cases of true joint ventures, however, ultimate control still
resides with public institutions.
73 In a few developing countries, though to a lesser extent than in China, TNC also contribute to investment
through FDI. The limits of FDI potential for development were briefly discussed in section II.
74 In  many  developing  countries  other  privileged  classes,  such  as  rural  landlords,  also  contribute to the same
phenomenon.
75 The  realization  of  the  potential  distributional  advantages  of  the public ownership of the main means of
production  is  not  automatic  (see  footnote  12).  In  China,  in  particular,  there  are  major  spatial  income  inequalities,
stemming  from  the  urban/rural divide and the uneven development of different regions. Following the exhaustion
of the initial positive impact of agricultural reforms on income distribution, stemming from the rapid increase in long
depressed  rural  incomes,  the  explosive  development  of  coastal  regions has deepened geographical inequalities
during the last 15 years, although all provinces have experienced some growth (Hu and Wang, 1999).
to the paucity of managerial skills in China, and the scarce development of market institutions, mergers
can be very effective in advancing overall business capabilities and generating positive externalities.
71
E.  Accumulation and technical progress in a socialist market economy
The evolving structure of industrial enterprises appears to be consistent with other systemic features
of the accumulation and investment process, which might be responsible in part for the fast development
of China’s socialist market economy.
The ambiguous property rights prevailing in COEs constitute a relatively efficient arrangement,
which is compatible with a strongly market-oriented growth path. SOEs are undergoing a gradual reform
process aimed at concentrating resources on a few large and strategic firms, which are expected to
operate in high-technology sectors within a diversified property rights framework. Yet, in both industrial
subsectors the fact that ultimate property rights are socialized at the level of one or more institutional
principals (national government, local government, banks, financial and management agencies)
72 can be
beneficial  to investment and accumulation, in comparison with the typical situation existing in other
developing countries. In the latter, the national agent of accumulation
73 is the local bourgeoisie, which
either controls most of the capital directly or commands it through the local bank structure, while in China
such a collective agent is constituted by a complex web of public bodies. Leakages from potentially
available investment funds owing to the conspicuous consumption of the bourgeoisie,
74 and to related
financial phenomena such as capital flight, constitute a brake on the development of national productive
forces.
Conversely, in a socialist economy, public economic and financial agents can in principle pool a
large amount of both forced and voluntary savings, and utilize productively the previously accumulated
industrial capital stemming from past undistributed profits. However, traditional socialist economies have
coupled  a  high  accumulation  potential  with  a  low  degree  of market orientation and a poor incentive
structure, leading to a high level of inefficiency. The complex challenge in China, as in other reforming
socialist countries, is to retain the positive features of the traditional socialist model, mainly in the fields
of capital accumulation and income distribution,
75 while simultaneously achieving a satisfactory level of- 33 -
76 The ability to absorb productively a sustained rate of capital accumulation was a crucial component of the
“miraculous” growth phenomenon in many Asian economies (Nelson and Pack, 1999).
77 “…  the  act  of  purchasing  a  new  piece of machinery (that is, investment) represents technical progress in
itself  in  that  it  entails  a  different  method  of  production. It is not clear that purchasing the machinery represents
exclusively capital accumulation” (ibid.: 22). Felipe refers to the classical contributions by Kaldor (1957), Solow (1960)
and Arrow (1962), and argues that the embodied character of technical progress does not allow to identify it simply
with Solow’s residual, as it is often implicitly assumed in many TFP-accounting exercises (see footnote 84).
78 During the reform period, high rates of accumulation and of technical progress de facto proved compatible
with  the  maintenance of a high, albeit diminishing, degree of what orthodox economists describe as static allocative
inefficiency. As an hypothesis to be tested by further research, it might be argued that the Chinese economy
displays  an  implicit  systemic  consistency,  according  to which static allocative inefficiency was at least in part a
condition  for  technical  progress  itself.  If  this  hypothesis  were  true,  any  approach to future reforms which placed
overdue  emphasis  on  piecemeal  attempts  at  improving  static  allocative  efficiency  should  be  regarded  with  caution.
79 However,  because of their residual public character, many COEs survive in the red for longer than would
normally be the case for private firms (see footnote 47).
efficiency in the allocation of resources and developing an adequate system of innovation conducive to
a speedy rate of technical progress.
76
It should also be taken into account that, contrary to the textbook abstraction according to which
technology would be exogenous and disembodied, and hence theoretically separable and independent from
real life investment processes, “most technological progress (if not all) must be embodied in new inputs”
(Felipe, 1999: 22).
77 Therefore, unless it takes place in a particularly inefficient and market incompatible
framework, a sustained accumulation process is per se an important factor conducive to fast technical
progress, especially in a catching-up economy with a high potential for technology absorption from abroad.
The industrial reform process in China has so far been compatible with the maintenance of a high rate of
accumulation, in spite of the negative impact of increased competition on profit rates, while at the same
time fostering the development of a complex innovation ladder enhancing imitative technological spillovers
flowing from the more advanced core to the millions of peripheral enterprises (Jefferson and Rawski,
1999).
78
In  rural  areas  in  particular,  decentralized,  strongly  market-oriented  COEs  have  tapped  their
structural potential advantages, including those stemming from their relatively underdeveloped technology.
In these enterprises ambiguous property rights ensure that this locally relevant high pool of investable
resources  is  utilized  in  a  largely  profit-maximizing  way.  Market  orientation  is  assured  by  the  relative
hardness of budget constraints, as local governments are too small to save ailing firms, nor are they under
a formal or even political obligation to do so.
79 In the state-owned industrial sector, which has traditionally
benefited from the enormous potential of socialist centralized planning apparatuses for the extraction and
pooling of resources, the trade-off between accumulation and efficiency has been progressively
deteriorating following the initial stage of industrialization, leading to successive waves of reforms. The
reforms  have  led,  on  balance, to significant improvements in terms of productive performance and
innovative  propensity,  but  also  to  a  deepening bifurcation inside state-owned industry, with LMEs
performing well, while many other SOEs have improved little in terms of efficiency and have caused
increasing financial losses.
In low and medium-technology sectors, COEs tend to improve TFP faster than most SOEs.
Shifting progressively to the non-state sector the bulk of presently existing SOEs can lead to an increase- 34 -
80 The advisability of narrowing the definition of the strategic core of SOEs is partly consistent, for instance,
with some of the policy conclusions of OECD (2000: 105).
81 To  the  extent that TVEs benefit from technological spillovers from SOEs, the existence of state industry
leads  to  less  overall  efficiency  loss  than  commonly  thought,  because  part  of  the  fast  growth of TVEs is made
possible by its symbiosis with SOEs.
82 Referred to in Huang et al. (1999a).
83 This  view  is  strengthened  by  the  observation  that  real  wages  in  SOEs  increased by 50 per cent in
1985–1996,  almost  doubling  the  corresponding figure for real wages in far more profitable COEs. Indirect wages
followed a similar trend.
in efficiency and growth potential
80 for the entire economy,
81 although at the price of a drop in the welfare
of many previously relatively privileged workers. However, the positive record of LMEs provides support
to another major component of the Chinese industrial strategy which aims at concentrating the most
advanced S&T potential on a small number of elite SOEs, along with sufficient human capital and financial
resources, in order to spearhead technical progress in the most advanced fields and to maximize its
economy-wide spillovers. If properly implemented, this two-pronged strategy might allow to retain the
advantages of socialized ownership while overcoming the traditional dynamic inefficiencies of Soviet-type
industry.
VI.  DID REFORMS FOSTER TECHNICAL PROGRESS?
A.  The controversy on the effectiveness of industrial reforms in SOEs
Many analysts tend to dismiss the depth and effectiveness of the successive waves of reforms
in the core of the state-held industrial sector. SOEs are seen as money losers, acting as a drain on the rest
of  the  economy  through  the  fiscal  and  financial  subsidies  they  require  from the state, captured by
bureaucrats’ and insiders’ vested interests, prone to wasteful overinvestment and to excessively generous
wages  and welfare expenditure, and hopelessly slow in catching up with technical progress. Lin et al.
(1999) recognize that the reforms enhanced the profit motive and thus the incentives for technical progress
and product innovation, but argue that SOEs are still too numerous to be properly monitored by the state
and too burdened by welfare costs and inefficiencies, and that they therefore represent a source of huge
financial losses. Huang et al. (1999b) dismiss the argument according to which SOE profitability was
affected by increased competition, on the ground that the profitability of state-owned firms declined also
in non-competitive, heavy sectors, while in almost every sector non-state enterprises did obtain positive
financial results. Huang et al. (1999a) agree on the fact that reforms did enhance enterprise autonomy,
but  contend  that  the  payoff  has  been  scarce,  as  political,  ideological  and  social  constraints  de  facto
minimized the effective threat which was supposed to arise from the growing budget constraints and risk
of bankruptcy. As a result, SOEs were captured by insiders (managers and workers), who disregarded
the principal’s (state) interests (Sicular, 1995;
82 Nichols and Zhao, 1996
83). Huang et al. (1999a: 1) state
bluntly that “SOE reform in China has been a failure”, and that the only long-term solution lies in the
outright privatization of state-owned industry.
In fact, the limited evidence stemming from statistical studies appears to show that there was a
certain qualitative improvement in the performance of SOEs in the early stages of industrial reforms,- 35 -
84 According  to  theory,  TFP  growth  can  also  arise  from  gains  in  allocative efficiency, including scale
economies.  As  the  definition  of  technical  progress  adopted  in  this  paper  is  a  broad  one  (see  the Introduction),
encompassing  inter  alia  changes in production organization, and taking into account that pure textbook-like
allocative changes in static, ceteris paribus situations are hard to identify in real-life economic situations, TFP growth
can be considered as a proxy for the rate of growth of technical progress. Yet, the informational value of TFP growth
might have been overstated in the literature, and its theoretical weaknesses, related to its neoclassical conceptual
base,  are  rarely  taken  into account. Moreover, TFP estimates can lack robustness, leading to contradictory results
(Felipe, 1999, and section VI..D below).
85 The  authors  acknowledge  that,  owing  to  the  residual  nature  of  technical  progress in their analytical
approach,  its  contribution  might have been overstated, as is often the case in Solow-type growth accounting
exercises.
86 See World Bank (2000b, table 7.1). Estimated TFP growth rates were, respectively, 2.1, 1.3 and 0.3 for the
Republic of Korea, the six Asian economies on average, and the United States. The extremely high estimate for China
includes,  according  to  the  World  Bank  methodology,  a  component  (1.5  per  cent)  stemming  from  sectoral  reallocation
and ownership changes. Even if this specific component were excluded, the residual TFP rate (2.5 per cent) for China
would still be the highest of the sample.
87 As  detailed  data  on  industrial  performance are not yet available for the late 1990s, the quantitative debate
has focused mainly on TFP estimates based on series which do not go beyond the 1980s.
88 Li analyses a panel data set of 272 SOEs over the 1980–1989 period.
which may be considered to have lasted up to the early 1990s. Particular attention has been devoted to
the measurement of a single indicator, total factor productivity (TFP).
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B.  Studies on TFP growth
Estimates  of  TFP  growth  for  the  entire  Chinese  economy,  carried  out  with different
methodologies, are consistent in showing a sustained rate of technical progress – a very high rate for
international standards. Hu and Wang (1999) present a growth accounting exercise on the whole Chinese
economy for the period 1978–1995, with the main goal of pinpointing the origin of uneven development
among the various Chinese provinces. Their results show that the main source of GDP growth has been
the accumulation of physical capital and that the contribution of technical progress has been very uneven
from  one  province  to  another.  However,  in  global  terms,  “the  contribution of technical progress …
contributed more to output growth in China than in East Asian and Latin American NIEs” (idem.: 152).
85
According  to  the  most  recent  World Bank estimate, the average TFP growth rate in China during
1980–1995 was 4 per cent, by far the highest of a sample including also the Republic of Korea and four
other fast-growing Asian countries, as well as the United States, the world technological leader.
86 The
conclusions of Jefferson and Singh (1999), a synthesis of the most relevant findings of many years of
World Bank research on China’s industry, also point in the same direction.
The evaluation of trends in technical progress in the state-owned industrial sector has led to less
clear-cut  results.
87  Chen  et  al.  (1988) estimate productivity trends in the SOE sector, and find an
increasing, long-term trend, which was appreciably strengthened by the reforms in the 1980s. According
to a World Bank (1992) estimate, in 1980–1988 TFP in SOEs grew on average by 2.4 per cent per year.
Other studies by Jefferson et al. (1992), Perkins (1995), and Li (1997)
88 find quite respectable rates of
TFP growth in the 1980s.
However, other analysts, such as McGuckin et al. (1992), Chow (1993) and Woo et al. (1994)
go as far as denying any TFP increase in state industry, even after the inception of the reforms. Wan
(1995) measures technical progress in state industry and finds a long-run positive trend hampered by major- 36 -
89 In  China more than elsewhere “nothing is unconnected to politics … technology diffusion and adoption
are slower in an uncertain economic or political environment” (Wan, 1995: 315–317).
90 Wan’s data stop at 1988 and thus fail to measure the impact, if any, of the new SOE reforms carried out in
the 1990s.
91 An  exception  appears  in  agriculture  in  the  mid-1980s,  the  period in which the implementation of the new
HRS produced a once-and-for-all gain in technical efficiency (see note 51).
92 Wu’s  estimates  also  show  a  declining  trend  in  technical progress and TFP growth in the SOE sector.
However, the author’s data do not cover the most recent period since the early 1990s, when SOE reforms intensified
and might have been expected to lead to an amelioration.
setbacks in correspondence to periods of political turmoil, such as the Great Leap Forward and the cultural
revolution.
89 He also reviews previous studies, observing that his own results are quite similar to those
obtained by Jefferson et al. (1992). Wan argues that the pessimists were more far off the mark than the
optimists, but his estimates show a less than expected impact of the reforms.
90
Wu  (1995)  proposes  a  different  methodology,  distinguishing  TFP  growth  into  two  (additive)
components, technological progress and changes in technical efficiency, the latter being the efficiency with
which the existing technology is applied to production. Wu estimates the rate of growth of technical
progress in three sectors (state industry, or SOEs), rural industry (roughly identifiable with rural COEs),
and agriculture. He recalls the well-known structural differences between the two main industrial sectors:
rural industry lacks access to first-class capital and technology, and often “uses machinery and equipment
written off and transferred from the state sector” (idem.: 210). The result of this symbiotic relation is
ambiguous, because rural industry can often turn its technological disadvantage into a significant cost
advantage, which will be reflected in measured productivity growth. Wu’s results show that TFP did grow,
albeit  unevenly  among  sectors.  Technical  progress  appears  to  dominate  technical  efficiency,  i.e. the
production frontier keeps shifting upwards, while the efficiency gap mostly remains.
91TFP growth was
notably higher in rural industry than in state industry and agriculture, mainly due to the contribution of the
technical progress component.
92
Differences  in  results  stem  mainly  from  the  use  of different data sources and statistical
methodologies, and in particular from the different deflators applied to inputs and outputs. Actually, Lo
(1999) re-examines the same data used by Woo et al. (1994) and reaches a quite different conclusion:
SOEs recorded a modest but positive rate of TFP growth in 1980–1992. On average, TFP growth rates
in SOEs were much lower than in COEs, but in the LME subsector of state-owned industry TFP growth
was even faster than in the collective industry. Especially after the publication of a second influential study
by Jefferson et al. (1996), the general impression is that SOEs as a whole did experience a significant
degree of technical upgrading and productivity increase. The most recent estimate by Jefferson et al.
(1999) reaches the conclusion that TFP in state industry grew at a rate ranging from 2 to 4 per cent per
annum in the 1980–1992 period, about half the rate achieved by the non-state sector, but still a positive
achievement. The accumulation of less systemic evidence in the second half of the 1990s points in the
direction of a continuing upward trend. But it is also clear that performance has been highly uneven among
different groups of SOEs, and that their overall financial situation continued to deteriorate well into the late
1990s.- 37 -
93 It  is  important  to  stress  that  the group “others” also comprises, along with purely private firms (both
Chinese  and  foreign-owned),  several  enterprises  characterized by a mixed form of ownership, which in recent years
have  multiplied  and  are  among the most advanced and faster-growing in the country’s industrial sector (see
section V). Therefore, these data have to be taken with a pinch of salt, as they might wrongly lead to subestimating
both the relative weight and the performance of public ownership and entrepreneurship in Chinese industry.
94 This  extraordinarily  high  figure  results  statistically  from  the  virtually  zero  base  from  which (recorded)
individual and other enterprises’ productive activities started in the early 1980s (see table 12).
C.  Production and productivity growth in China’s industry, 1980–1999 
Recent data published in the China Statistical Yearbook 2000 (referred to as SSB 2000, as it
was  issued  by  the  State  Statistical  Bureau)  illustrate  the  main  trends  in industrial production and
employment.  For  SOEs  in  particular  (the  only  group  of  industrial  enterprises  for  which  consistent
investment data are readily available), these figures also allow for an elementary but updated estimate of
a “residual”, which could be interpreted as a proxy for the growth of TFP.
During the 20-year period 1980–1999, overall industrial production increased at an average
(arithmetic) annual rate of 15 per cent. Industrial growth was faster in COEs (over 15 per cent per year
on average) than in SOEs (7 per cent), and even faster in the residual group of industrial firms formed
Table 12
China’s industry: basic data, 1980–1999s
Year SOEs COEs Others Total
Real GDP 1980 392 121 2 515
Billions of yuan 1990 1270.5 856.7 246.5 2373.8
1995 2834.8 3620.7 2795.5 9251.1
1999 3657.9 4847.4 5666.8 14172.1
Average rate of growth 1980–99 6.99 19.13 42.7 15.1
Employment (millions) 1980 33.3 17.1 16.7 67.1
1990 43.6 34.0 19.4 97.0
1995 44.0 37.1 28.9 109.9
1999 24.1 32.1 34.4 90.6
Labour productivity 1980 11.8 7.1 0.1 7.7
(thousands of yuan, 1980) 1990 29.1 25.2 12.7 24.5
1995 64.5 97.7 96.8 84.2
1999 151.7 151.2 164.6 156.4
Investment 1980 41.0 -- -- --
(billions of yuan, 1980) 1990 170.2 -- -- --
1995 411.3 -- -- --
1999 472.0 -- -- --
Sources: SSB (2000).
by  “individual  enterprises”  plus  all  the  remaining  non-homogenous  enterprises classified officially as
“others”
93 (over 40 per cent)
94 (see table 12 and figure 1). Employment and labour productivity trends are- 38 -
95 As  explained  elsewhere  in  this  section  and  in  section  V,  these  averages  mask  large  differences  in  labour
productivity  internal  to  each  ownership  group.  Many  SOEs,  mainly  among  the small ones, are plagued by low
productivity,  but  the  subgroup  of  state-owned  LMEs  comprises  a  large  share  of  China’s most technologically
advanced  and  productive  industrial  enterprises. Even if some large and advanced COEs also exist, the bulk of non-
SOE  highly  productive  enterprises are either joint ventures or fully (foreign-owned) private firms, belonging to the
residual  “other”  ownership  group.  Conversely,  most  individual industrial enterprises are relatively efficient, but
small, and their technological and productivity levels are low.
96 Data  on  GDP  and  investment  in  industrial  SOEs  in  constant  1980  prices  have  been  obtained  from  data  in
current prices applying the implicit deflator obtained from the series of real GDP growth rates by ownership groups
of  sectors  of  industrial  enterprises.  This  simplified  procedure  necessarily  implies  ignoring  the  issue  of  attempting
to  estimate  different deflators for industrial output and investment goods respectively, which was at the source of
some of the differences in results in the studies on SOEs’ TFP growth discussed above in this section.
97 By itself, however, our simplified empirical assumption is not incompatible with a production function-based
theoretical approach.
98 A  very  similar  methodology has been applied recently by Lin and Liu (2000: 8) in an exercise aimed at
testing the impact of fiscal decentralization on growth in different provinces of China, using “ the growth rate of per
capita investment, in real terms, in fixed assets as a proxy for the growth rate of capital”.
shown in table 12 and figures 2 and 3. The large fall in SOE employment in the late 1990s is particularly
striking.  As  SOE  production did not decrease correspondingly, labour productivity in this group of
enterprises, which had been lagging behind that in the other two groups, recovered strongly in the late
1990s. By 1999 average labour productivity in SOEs was slightly higher than in COEs and not much lower
than in individual and other enterprises
95 (see table 12 and figure 3). Investment growth in SOEs was
sustained over most of the period but slowed down in the second half of the 1990s (see table 12 and
figure 4).
96
D.  Estimating the “residual” factor contributing
 to the growth of labour productivity in SOEs
Our estimate of the growth residual in SOEs is based on assuming that the basic factor driving the
growth of production is the growth of investment, especially in a growing developing economy like China.
Therefore, normalizing for labour, we posit a functional relation between the rate of growth of labour
productivity per employee (grY/L) and the rate of growth of the investment/labour ratio (grI/L):
gr (Y/L) = f (grI/L) (1)
This assumption differs from the orthodox one based on the production function, the main arguments of
which are the two main production factors, capital and labour.
97 The latter is not immune from theoretical
problems and shortcomings, stemming in part from its direct derivation from the neoclassical theory and
in particular from the latter’s concept of capital (see footnote 84; also Felipe, 1999; Hulten, 2000; Barro
and Sala-I-Martin, 1995a). Our alternative approach assumes a functional relation between two easily
identified quantities measured in value (output and investment per worker, respectively). Hence, it avoids
the difficulties implied by the dubious attribution of the same “production factor” property to both labour
and  capital,  upon  which  is  based  the  attempt  to  measure in a symmetrical fashion their respective
contribution to output in the neoclassical production function approach. However, the main advantage of
our alternative approach stems from the practical difficulty of obtaining an estimate of the capital stock,
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99 Owing to the simplified character of the regression specification, the interpretation of c as a catch-all proxy
for  all  non-capital  factors  contributing  to  output  growth  is  likely  to  contain  an  upward bias, as it also captures a
portion of the contribution to output growth stemming from the increase in the capital stock. In fact, even if gross
investment  data  embody  a  share  of  investment  funds  which just replaces worn-out productive capacity, the rest
under  normal  circumstances  does  contribute  to  the  creation  of  new  productive  potential. Therefore, if gross
investment  were  constant,  or  increased  very  slowly,  the  capital  stock  per  worker  would  still  be  increasing,  albeit  at
a  declining  rate  (for  instance,  at  an  initial  capital  stock  level  of  100  and  a  constant  investment  level  of  10),  and  its
contribution  to  output  could  not  be  properly  captured  by  the  grI/L  variable. However, in a scenario characterized
usually  by  rapidly  increasing  investment  rates,  as  that  of  China’s  industry,  this statistical problem becomes less
serious, and the growth of investment per worker can more reasonably be considered as a proxy for the growth of
capital stock per worker.
100 According  to  the  very broad concept of technical progress described in the Introduction, gains in human
capital accumulation may also be considered as a form of technical progress for a country as a whole.
101 Estimates have been made using  the ordinary least squares (OLS) method.  As both variables are in the form
of growth rates, the validity of these regression results is not contingent on the stationarity of the respective series
in levels form.
102 In  the  augmented  regression,  all  explanatory  variables are significant; the  R-square  and  the  F  statistics  are
higher than in the previous model, and the DW statistic is close to 2.
Assuming a linear functional form
gr (Y/L) = " + $ (grI/L) + , (2)
(where , is the error term), the intercept c can be interpreted as the (annual growth rate of) the sum of
all the residual factors, different from the growth in the investment per employee, which contributed to
the growth of labour productivity.
99 Besides technical progress in the broadest possible sense, and thus
embodying as well the gains stemming from improved X-efficiency, c is fuelled, for instance, by increases
in human capital.
100
The estimate of equation (2) for industrial SOEs over the period 1980–1999 led to theory-consistent
coefficient signs and significant values of the t and f statistics.
101 However, the R-square was not very
high, and the value of the DW statistics indicated the presence of autocorrelation (see table 13). As data
on labour productivity show that a strong improvement took place in the second half of the 1990s (see
figure 3), a dummy variable (d94) was introduced, with values 1 one in the 1994–1999 subperiod and zero
for the preceding years. The presence of the dummy also allows for testing for the hypothesis of a major
impact on productivity stemming from the latest round of reforms, which started actually around 1994 (see
section V). The presence of the d94 dummy, which turned out to be positive and highly significant,
markedly improved the regression results
102 (see regression (b) in table 13). We conclude tentatively that
the results of our simple exercise, based on very aggregate and basic data, provide support to the two
following propositions. First, over the entire period of 1980–1999 the growth in industrial SOE labour
productivity was attributable to a significant extent to a set of factors different from the increase in
investment per employee, among which technical progress is likely to have been paramount. Second, the
impact of these productivity-enhancing factors increased strikingly in the latest 1994–1999 subperiod. Our
data, however, do not allow to disentangle which portion of these productivity gains is attributable merely
to the dramatic labour shedding which took place in that subperiod, and which could rather be attributable
to sustainable systemic improvements stemming from the intensification of industrial enterprise reforms.- 42 -
Table 13
Regression results
Variables Coeff. t  R
2 DW F
(a)  gr(Y/L) = "+$ (grI/L) + , -- -- -- 0.35  1.1 9.3
grI/L 0.43 3.04 -- -- --
" 7.7 2.5 -- -- --
(b)  gr(Y/L) = "+$ (grI/L) + d94 + , -- -- -- 0.65 1.75 14.6
grI/L 0.35 3.2 -- -- --
" 5.3 2.2 -- -- --
d94 11.9 3.6 -- -- --
Source: SSB (2000).
VII.  CONCLUSIONS
This paper analyses some aspects of China’s reformed and reforming S&T and industrial systems,
which are related to the economy’s overall capacity to absorb and generate technical progress and to
transmit and spread it to the spheres of production and distribution. Our conclusion is that China’s socialist
economic system, after undergoing important and largely market-oriented reforms, appears tobe capable
of  driving  a  still  developing  economy towards an accelerated path not only of accumulation and
quantitative growth, but also of broadly understood technical progress.
The present and future sustainability of this path is dependent upon the existence and evolution of
various institutions which interact reciprocally through market and non-market relations, fostering the
absorption of advanced technology from abroad and integrating it with a strong indigenous R&D effort.
In this process, policy makers try to maximize the benefits potentially attainable from the growth of a yet
embryonic domestic market for knowledge, the implementation of strategic technological programmes,
and centralized state intervention in the key fields of industrial policies and of negotiations with TNCs. 
After the initial success of agricultural reforms, this articulated strategy has so far been proceeding
along with the reform of the dominant public sector of industry. In China, as elsewhere, enterprises are
responsible for the application of internally and externally generated knowledge to practical production and
distribution problems, and unless their behavioural functions are properly geared towards this key task, any
S&T strategy would be inevitably doomed to ultimate economic failure.
COEs, which have enjoyed traditionally a high degree of autonomy and are strongly market-oriented,
have been very successful. They increased their participation in total industrial output and appear set to
absorb an important share of ailing, non-strategic SOEs. Their performance has been superior to that of
SOEs as a whole also in qualitative terms, as they have achieved better financial results and higher rates
of productivity and technical progress, while commanding far less measurable resources in terms of both
physical and human capital. However, a more detailed analysis shows that the LMEs subsector of state
industry  have  performed  quite  well.  Technical  progress  in  the  high-technology  sectors has been- 43 -
concentrated in this industrial subsector. Hence, policy makers see the strengthening of large,
technologically advanced SOEs as pivotal for the long-term overall development of the Chinese economy.
The proponents of a selective revamping of the SOE sector also point out that COEs have thrived
mainly in those low and medium technological sectors which allow for the maximization of China’s static
comparative advantages. As these advantages stem from China’s underdevelopment, their relevance is
bound to diminish in the future if the country continues to move forward and catch up with more advanced
countries. Moreover, part of COEs success has also been kind to a sort of trickling-down effect by virtue
of which they acquired physical and human capital and technology from SOEs at below-market prices via
cheap informal channels. Its sustainability is therefore to some extent dependent upon the existence and
upgrading of more sophisticated technological capacities in the state-run industrial sector.
SOE  reforms  have  focused  initially  on  increased  autonomy  and  market orientation and on the
reshaping of the managers’ behavioural function through the contract responsibility system. Since the mid-
1990s emphasis has shifted towards the concentration of resources on a core of large strategic
enterprises, which are believed to be capable of realizing economies of scale and scope and to be
organizationally adequate to be the locus of the country’s catching-up effort in high-technology sectors.
To this purpose, on one hand, core SOEs are set to undergo a process of corporatization in the framework
of  a  renewed  and  diversified  system  of  public  ownership.  On  the  other  hand,  they  are expected to
maximize the advantages potentially obtainable through non-market channels from strategic state support
in the fields of industrial policies, negotiations with TNCs, and horizontal collaboration with the national
R&D  system.  According  to  present  policy  orientations,  non-strategic SOEs will undergo a status
transformation, and those which survive will cease to be part of the state sector. However, even taking
into account a certain degree of acceleration in the late 1990s, the reform process in the state-owned
industrial sector is proceeding slowly and gradually, due to its delicate social and political implications.
The overall sustainability of this complex development path necessarily requires a high degree of
market  compatibility,  with  respect  to  the  transformation and circulation of commodities (knowledge
included), and of incentive compatibility, with respect to the behavioural patterns of the various economic
agents. The bulk of technical innovations and imitations generated and acquired as forms of economically
relevant  knowledge  must  eventually  lead  to the production and commercialization of more advanced
and/or cheaper commodities for which a real domestic or foreign market does exist. Planners, managers
and workers must face an adequate incentive system as individuals, and the institutions and organizations
in which they work, as collective bodies, must as well be confronted with incentives conducive to virtuous
behavioural responses.
The experience of the last two decades shows that China’s reformers have been able so far to
achieve  innovative  and  feasible (although imperfect and often unsystematic) solutions to the
aforementioned problems, within the framework of a continuously evolving regime of socialist property
relations. The present direction of S&T and enterprise reform policies, with their emphasis on the
acceleration of technical progress in high-technology core sectors, appears to be moving in the right
direction.- 44 -
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103 This Annex relies mainly on official Chinese statistical information, most of it produced by the State
Statistical Bureau and the State Economic and Trade Commission, and is reported in various issues of the Economist
Intelligence Unit reports, newspapers and on-line information networks.
104 The  bulk  of  SOE  exports is still constituted of lower value-added traditional products in heavy industrial
and consumer goods sectors, which are very susceptible to price competition that was particularly fierce in 1999 due
to  the  incipient  recovery  of  some  battered  Asian  countries anxious to regain their footing in international markets.
However, the state industry still contributes almost half of total Chinese exports, with most of the rest coming from
foreign invested enterprises (Economist Intelligence Unit, 1999).
105 Several other initiatives are being implemented to improve the regulation of the financial sector.
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Recent developments in industrial reforms and S&T policies
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A. Measures to rein in SOEs’ financial losses
The accumulation of evidence on the less than satisfactory performance of many SOEs, even during
a time of sustained industrial expansion for the economy as a whole, has added to the urgency of acting
swiftly to tackle the sector’s serious financial problems and to translate into practice the slogan “grasp the
big, enliven the small”. During 1999 SOEs’ output kept growing, but the problem of overproduction by
many SOEs continued to persist, and their exports fared poorly.
104 In the meantime, the structural, largely
social  and  political,  as  well  as  institutional causes of many problems of SOEs were also becoming
increasingly evident. A recent study by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences confirms that SOEs
spend excessively for workers’ welfare. By 1995, 28 per cent of the fixed assets of SOEs had been
diverted for non-business purposes, compared to 10 per cent for other types of firms. Average social
welfare expenditure per worker was 3,350 yuan in SOEs (58 per cent of wages), against 1,070 in COEs.
Without this excessive welfare expenditure, most SOEs would actually not be losing money. In fact, the
value of new, fixed, non-productive investment by money-losing heavy SOEs was equal to 97.83 per cent
of their losses (China Daily, 1 February 2000).
Stern measures to deal with SOE losses intensified in 1998–1999. Bankruptcies and closures of
money-losing SOEs were mushrooming. By August 1999 SOEs were 48,200, down from 56,100 in late
1998. The downsizing of the SOE sector is necessary both in the short term, in order to preserve basic
macroeconomic and financial equilibria, and from a long-term development perspective, but it cannot be
carried out in a hurried and indiscriminate fashion as it is causing the loss of millions of jobs, only some
of which can be immediately replaced. As part of the overall reform process, and attempting to deal with
such potentially explosive and conflicting goals, a plan of debt for equity swaps has been launched by the
State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC). To be eligible, state enterprises must, on one hand, be
losing money, but on the other hand they must be large and strategically relevant, and must show good
market perspectives and internal restructuring potential. The plan, besides fostering the restructuring of
potentially viable albeit financially troubled industrial enterprises, aims at freeing the banks of bad debts.
To this purpose, SOE ownership is to be transferred to newly established asset management companies
(AMCs), leaving the banks free to lend commercially on a business basis instead of acting passively under
government order. If successful, this plan will constitute an important step forward in the overall process
of institutional upgrading of industrial corporate governance, and will contribute to the modernization and
autonomization of the banking sector.
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106 Incentives  for  managers  of  profitable  SOEs  will  include  the  option  of  buying  shares,  but  these  will  not  be
tradeable and will be given to them only when they leave the company.
107 China  National  Petroleum  Corporation,  the  largest  oil  company,  is the first in the sector to seek an
international  listing,  with  an  initial  public  offering  set  at  $7  billion,  higher  than  Telecom’s  in  Hong  Kong  (China)  in
1997 ($4.2 billion). More than 20 large SOEs plan to list shares in Hong Kong (China), with the goal of raising funds
for technological restructuring and to improve their competitiveness (Financial Times, 23 December 1999).
108 Initially,  industrial  enterprises  were  allowed  under different sets of rules to issue two different types of
shares  (A  and  B),  for  domestic  and  foreign  investors  respectively, but since September 1999 foreign-invested
enterprises have been authorized to issue both types of shares.
B. The revamping of SOEs’ structural reforms
The  reform  process  in  the  state-owned  industrial  sector  underwent a retrenchment exercise in
1997–1998, as the government reacted cautiously to the relative slowdown and to the potential risks
stemming from the Asian financial crisis. SOE reforms regained momentum in 1999, and were the main
focus of the Fourth Plenum of the Fifteenth Central Committee, held in September of that year.
The Fourth Plenum confirmed the main policy lines on SOE restructuring. The state will continue
to play the major role, but there will be an “effective method of public ownership” with mixed forms of
ownership and joint stock companies. The state will concentrate on a limited core of LMEs, most of them
in high-technology industries, encouraging non-state investors to take up the rest of presently existing
SOEs.  The  remaining  SOEs  are  expected  to  play  a  dominant role, and to this purpose they will be
encouraged to also raise funds autonomously from domestic and foreign capital markets. Some large
SOEs with listed shares will increase their non-state quota, but the majority will still be state-held. Part
of the funds obtained through the capital market will contribute to the restructuring of other SOEs. Funds
will also be increased to write off bad debts for banks, and to prepare the merger or bankruptcy of
medium and large SOEs and the closure of money-losing mines. Among the SOEs operating in traditional,
capital-intensive,  resource-based  fields,  many  are  to be closed or will drastically reduce production,
especially those in the sectors of coal, iron and sugar. Selected large state enterprises in the steel industry
will be renovated technologically with ample funds (CBNet, January 2000). Reforms are also expected
to  improve  corporate  governance  and  gear  SOEs  operation  more  effectively  towards the market,
separating more clearly governmental functions from enterprise management. The internal distribution
system of SOEs will be improved to make it more consistent with the modern enterprise system and to
provide  effective  incentives.
106  SOEs  are also encouraged to establish their own technological
development centres, although the state will improve costs and product quality supervision.
The process of corporatization of large SOEs is gaining momentum. More than 800 large of them
have listed stock on the market, becoming “joint-shareholding companies”; however, the state still holds
a majority of shares.
107 High technology firms are being accorded a priority in this process, and have been
allowed preferential conditions to enlist on the stock market.
108
Many local governments are also taking the initiative to reform and upgrade technologically industrial
enterprises. In Beijing, where an explosive growth of technology-based new enterprises is taking place,
some SOEs are going to start setting autonomously their wage levels (China Daily, 2 February 2000).
The government of Wuhan, capital of Hubei Province, decided to stop launching new totally state-owned
SOEs,  to  diversify  ownership  and  to  concentrate  state  funds  on  high-technology industry, while
withdrawing  progressively  from low-technology competitive industries (CBNet, December 1999).- 51 -
109 The  financial improvement of the SOE sector is expected to continue during the first half of the present
decade. The government hopes to rid state industry of major losses in a three-year period.
110 The degree of control and ownership rights to be allowed to foreign investors in the telecom sector
constitutes  a  controversial  issue,  which  has  been  among  the  main  topics  in  the  negotiations  held with the United
States and the European Union in order to gain China’s membership to WTO.
111 To this purpose, a new optical fibre network is being set up. It will be the world’s first IP-based optical fibre
commercial network, with a bandwitch of 20 gigabits.
Guandong Province is turning its R&D institutions into corporate entities, with workers encouraged to buy
stakes in their companies (CBNet, September 1999).
Preliminary results appear to indicate that in 1999 the SOE sector as a whole began to show clear
signs of improvement. By August the percentage of SOEs in the red was 50 per cent, down from 56 per
cent by end 1998, 60 per cent of which were making only very small losses.
109 Staff cuts and management
reform helped to lift SOE profits by 70 per cent in the whole of 1999, and valued added rose by 8.9 per
cent. Annexing and bankruptcies became more widespread. The debt-to-equity conversion policy has been
proceeding, with a total funding of 112.2 billion yuan. Two thousand out of 16,000 large and medium SOEs
have applied, but only 601 have been selected so far. Technology renovation is also been implemented.
Particularly encouraging financial results have been obtained by the machine tool industry, which plays
a very important role for the technological development of the whole industrial sector. The industry turned
profitable and grew again in 1998 and 1999, after five years of losses and decline. Domestic producers
regained more than 50 per cent of the Chinese domestic market and increased exports in value by 14.5
per cent (SETC, reported in Economist Intelligence Unit, 1999 and 2000).
C. The restructuring of telecom industry and the
national technology innovation conference
Along with the market-oriented reorganization of a large part of the SOE sector, the government has
continued  its  policy  of  planned restructuring and technological upgrading in a few crucial, quasi-
monopolistic,  high-technology  sectors  of  decisive  strategic relevance, in which China has already
established a firm foothold. Among them, the telecommunications industry is the most important. Policy
makers and industrial leaders try to walk a fine line, striving to achieve an optimum degree of domestic
competition and to increase the industry’s attractiveness for technology-intensive FDI,
110 while maintaining
a strategic command over the development of the sector.
China Telecom, a large SOE presently dominating the industry, is among the world’s top 10 telecom
companies. It already has one state-owned competitor, China Unicom, and a third one is soon to be
launched. The new company, China Nectar Corporation, will focus on Internet protocol backbone services
and international integrated data services.
111 It will be owned by the Chinese Academy of Sciences, The
State Administration of Radio, Film and Television, the Ministry of Railways and the Shanghai Municipal
Government, each with equal shares. This complex structure constitutes an interesting example of the
modern, diversified form of public ownership which is proposed as a model for the restructuring of all core
SOEs. The various telecom enterprises will enjoy substantial autonomy, while the Ministry of Information
will remain in charge of supervision, coordination and planning tasks, including the orientation of technical
progress, the formulation and implementation of industrial policies, and the regulation and surveillance of
the market (Wu Jichuan, Minister of the Information Industry, 2000).- 52 -
In the field of S&T policy proper, among the major recent initiatives a national technology innovation
conference  was  held  in  August  1999. Policy orientation is favourable to the development of high-
technology industries with strengthened intellectual property rights, with an important role for technology-
based small and medium enterprises. Most research institutes should be turned into enterprises and enter
market  competition.  To  this  end,  preferential  policies  are  being  launched  to  give  tax  incentives to
financially trapped research institutions. The tax incentives package is expected to accelerate the reform
of the R&D system and to promote the industrialization of R&D findings (CBNet, August 1999).- 53 -
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